Replication data for: Attracting Trouble: Democracy, Leadership Tenure, and the Targeting of Militarized Challenges (doi:10.7910/DVN/JKBAHM)

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Part 1: Document Description
Part 2: Study Description
Part 3: Data Files Description
Part 4: Variable Description
Part 5: Other Study-Related Materials
Entire Codebook

Document Description

Citation

Title:

Replication data for: Attracting Trouble: Democracy, Leadership Tenure, and the Targeting of Militarized Challenges

Identification Number:

doi:10.7910/DVN/JKBAHM

Distributor:

Harvard Dataverse

Date of Distribution:

2007-11-28

Version:

1

Bibliographic Citation:

Christopher Gelpi; Joseph M. Grieco, 2007, "Replication data for: Attracting Trouble: Democracy, Leadership Tenure, and the Targeting of Militarized Challenges", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/JKBAHM, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:3:2dhjp7C91WM4Nubh56Ls1Q== [fileUNF]

Study Description

Citation

Title:

Replication data for: Attracting Trouble: Democracy, Leadership Tenure, and the Targeting of Militarized Challenges

Identification Number:

doi:10.7910/DVN/JKBAHM

Authoring Entity:

Christopher Gelpi (Duke University)

Joseph M. Grieco (Duke University)

Date of Production:

2001

Distributor:

Harvard Dataverse

Distributor:

Christopher Gelpi

Date of Deposit:

2007

Date of Distribution:

2007

Holdings Information:

https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/JKBAHM

Study Scope

Abstract:

Otherwise powerful, formidable democracies are tempting targets for international violence because they have leaders who, on average, have been in office for shorter periods of time than leaders of autocracies. Domestic incentives may make resistance more costly than offering concessions for inexperienced leaders of both democratic and authoritarian states. Over time, however, resistance may become domestically less costly, causing experienced leaders to be more likely to prefer resistance. Anticipating this response, potential challengers may be more likely to target inexperienced leaders. Because democracies generally have high rates of leadership turnover, they are tempting targets for international violence. Statistical analysis of crisis initiation between 1918 and 1992 confirms the perception that democracies are more likely to be targets of militarized challenges. Results are also consistent with the proposition that the relatively short tenure in office served by democratic leaders helps to account for the observed pattern of democratic attraction of foreign challenges.

Time Period:

1918-1992

Methodology and Processing

Sources Statement

Data Access

Notes:

<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0">CC0 1.0</a>

Other Study Description Materials

Related Publications

Citation

Title:

Gelpi, Christopher; Grieco, Joseph. 2001. "Attracting Trouble: Democracy, Leadership Tenure, and the Targeting of Militarized Challenges" Journal of Conflict Resolution, 45, No. 6, 794-817. <a href= "http://jcr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/45/6/794" target= "_new"> article available here</a>

Bibliographic Citation:

Gelpi, Christopher; Grieco, Joseph. 2001. "Attracting Trouble: Democracy, Leadership Tenure, and the Targeting of Militarized Challenges" Journal of Conflict Resolution, 45, No. 6, 794-817. <a href= "http://jcr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/45/6/794" target= "_new"> article available here</a>

File Description--f110321

File: Attracting-trouble.tab

  • Number of cases: 2418

  • No. of variables per record: 26

  • Type of File: text/tab-separated-values

Notes:

UNF:3:2dhjp7C91WM4Nubh56Ls1Q==

Data file for this study

Variable Description

List of Variables:
  • dyadid - State Dyad-Year
  • year - Year
  • defender - Defending Leader's Name
  • def - Defender CCODE
  • challeng - Challenging Leader's Name
  • chall - Challenger CCODE
  • conflict - Chal Initiation of Int'l Crisis
  • trigdate - Date of Crisis Initiation
  • termdate - Date of Crisis Termination
  • lndefexp - Ln of Defending Leader Experience
  • defpol4 - Defender Polity Regime Score
  • dfdemexp - Ln Defender Experience X Defender Regime
  • lnchaexp - Ln of Challenging Leader Experience
  • chalpol4 - Challenger Polity Regime Score
  • dymilbal - Balance of Military Capabilities
  • defmajp - Defender is COW Major Power
  • chmajp - Challenger is COW Major Power
  • border - States Share a Border
  • dist - Distance Between States
  • chatrans - Challenger Regime Transition
  • deftrans - Defender Regime Transition
  • dayint - Days of Interaction in Leader Dyad-Year
  • peaceyrs - Years since last conflict
  • _spline1 - (peaceyrs-k1) cubed
  • _spline2 - (peaceyrs-k2) cubed
  • _spline3 - (peaceyrs-k3) cubed

Variables

State Dyad-Year

f110321 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:SF/8o1lyWGKLa+049Yq3Mg==

Year

f110321 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:MNudBCzBQihMCnSYy+r0Yg==

Defending Leader's Name

f110321 Location:

Variable Format: character

Notes: UNF:3:SsvM20ZSEiNzFC42FJ7/3Q==

Defender CCODE

f110321 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:z4u0I9N53Kru5EOv+3HGBQ==

Challenging Leader's Name

f110321 Location:

Variable Format: character

Notes: UNF:3:SgmS7fopAeWd0gZaxgCNXQ==

Challenger CCODE

f110321 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:vG+hY2z74GYJvlJg2lOYJw==

Chal Initiation of Int'l Crisis

f110321 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:EGlJHdQEEwJQz/ZjPCko0A==

Date of Crisis Initiation

f110321 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:jmRnF8ZdlnEXMPphUwoXXA==

Date of Crisis Termination

f110321 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:Ksjxr+JU49tdeJaw9n4IIQ==

Ln of Defending Leader Experience

f110321 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:Fz7v12SNk28d5gqdi91jWw==

Defender Polity Regime Score

f110321 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:wOe1H96pQwSOB9UVf/i5Xw==

Ln Defender Experience X Defender Regime

f110321 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:e9dQYiKuCHeruzlMo9F8ng==

Ln of Challenging Leader Experience

f110321 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:zeEaddNyKaOASSobrfdvWA==

Challenger Polity Regime Score

f110321 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:8CBiA86jXaHaIVv3ehHE+Q==

Balance of Military Capabilities

f110321 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:uK3qmPSaoDXTeMHizL+LQw==

Defender is COW Major Power

f110321 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:1sjCjeC+y9asfHQbBtmJuQ==

Challenger is COW Major Power

f110321 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:wkSleXfDOLLNQX/LSP3wfA==

States Share a Border

f110321 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:zL+31sbX4BdfXoi8LW6WjA==

Distance Between States

f110321 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:Olpm7ovzxFKYkSjb0Bqj8A==

Challenger Regime Transition

f110321 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:O8Hv49sno0syahg9dIhYNQ==

Defender Regime Transition

f110321 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:9fRNilSo/gIWKU15UeNxyg==

Days of Interaction in Leader Dyad-Year

f110321 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:vbTPhGNv1EXfRdLc8yYTzg==

Years since last conflict

f110321 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:7VELTFLtRSR2TB0hf62fMQ==

(peaceyrs-k1) cubed

f110321 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:X1MJ299oQVz7N9QhuCqxyg==

(peaceyrs-k2) cubed

f110321 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:dLBOzPTyg1vcg5Nt/3lnjA==

(peaceyrs-k3) cubed

f110321 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:gsKyYEXkMJHCiTFHcqhQRg==

Other Study-Related Materials

Label:

trouble.zip

Text:

Zip file containing data for this study in original file format

Notes:

application/octet-stream