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Part 1: Document Description
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Citation |
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Title: |
Replication data for: Does Third-Party Trade Reduce Conflict? Credible Signaling versus Opportunity Costs |
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Identification Number: |
doi:10.7910/DVN/23871 |
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Distributor: |
Harvard Dataverse |
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Date of Distribution: |
2013-12-11 |
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Version: |
2 |
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Bibliographic Citation: |
Kinne, Brandon J, 2013, "Replication data for: Does Third-Party Trade Reduce Conflict? Credible Signaling versus Opportunity Costs", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/23871, Harvard Dataverse, V2 |
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Citation |
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Title: |
Replication data for: Does Third-Party Trade Reduce Conflict? Credible Signaling versus Opportunity Costs |
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Identification Number: |
doi:10.7910/DVN/23871 |
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Authoring Entity: |
Kinne, Brandon J (The University of Texas at Dallas) |
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Producer: |
Kinne, Brandon J |
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Date of Production: |
2014 |
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Distributor: |
Harvard Dataverse |
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Distributor: |
Harvard Dataverse Network |
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Access Authority: |
Kinne, Brandon J |
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Date of Deposit: |
2013-12-11 |
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Date of Distribution: |
2014 |
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Holdings Information: |
https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/23871 |
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Study Scope |
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Keywords: |
militarized interstate disputes, social network analysis, third party intervention, international security, bargaining, information asymmetry, opportunity costs |
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Abstract: |
The study of trade and conflict has largely focused on dyadic interdependence, or trade within discrete pairs of states. Yet, states may also be indirectly interdependent, by way of trade to third parties. This paper examines the influence of third-party trade on dyadic conflict initiation. I argue that certain structures of trade provide economically invested third parties with (1) an incentive to discourage dyadic conflict between a potential initiator and a potential target, and (2) the means to show disapproval of conflict by sending trade-based signals of resolve. The argument thus emphasizes the ability of third parties to introduce novel ex post information into bargaining dynamics, causing potential aggressors to reconsider their conflict strategies. Empirical analysis shows that, in fact, when a given dyad shares the sort of trade structures that enable costly signaling by third parties, the probability of conflict initiation declines substantially. In contrast, when third-party trade merely increases a potential initiator's opportunity costs for conflict, conflict behavior remains unchanged. |
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Methodology and Processing |
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Sources Statement |
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Data Access |
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Notes: |
<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0">CC0 1.0</a> |
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Other Study Description Materials |
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Related Publications |
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Citation |
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Title: |
Kinne, Brandon J. 2014. "Does Third-Party Trade Reduce Conflict? Credible Signaling versus Opportunity Costs," in Conflict Management and Peace Science 31(1). |
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Identification Number: |
10.1177/0738894213501135 |
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Bibliographic Citation: |
Kinne, Brandon J. 2014. "Does Third-Party Trade Reduce Conflict? Credible Signaling versus Opportunity Costs," in Conflict Management and Peace Science 31(1). |
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Label: |
CMPS-Replication.zip |
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Text: | |
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Notes: |
application/zip |