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Part 1: Document Description
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Citation |
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Title: |
Replication data for: Institutional Sources of Legitimate Authority |
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Identification Number: |
doi:10.7910/DVN/24797 |
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Distributor: |
Harvard Dataverse |
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Date of Distribution: |
2014-03-18 |
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Version: |
2 |
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Bibliographic Citation: |
Dickson, Eric S.; Gordon, Sanford C.; Huber, Gregory A., 2014, "Replication data for: Institutional Sources of Legitimate Authority", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/24797, Harvard Dataverse, V2 |
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Citation |
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Title: |
Replication data for: Institutional Sources of Legitimate Authority |
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Subtitle: |
An Experimental Investigation |
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Identification Number: |
doi:10.7910/DVN/24797 |
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Authoring Entity: |
Dickson, Eric S. (New York University) |
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Gordon, Sanford C. (New York University) |
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Huber, Gregory A. (Yale University) |
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Producer: |
Gordon, Sanford C. |
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Distributor: |
Harvard Dataverse |
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Access Authority: |
Gordon, Sanford C. |
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Depositor: |
Gordon, Sanford C. |
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Date of Deposit: |
2014-02-26 |
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Date of Distribution: |
2014-02-26 |
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Holdings Information: |
https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/24797 |
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Study Scope |
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Keywords: |
Institutions, Legitimacy, Public goods, Authority, Experiment, Incentives, Compensation, Transparency, Political psychology |
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Abstract: |
Unelected officials with coercive powers (e.g., police, prosecutors, bureaucrats) vary markedly in the extent to which citizens view their actions as legitimate. We explore the institutional determinants of legitimate authority in the context of a public goods laboratory experiment. In the experiment, an ``authority'' can target one ``citizen'' for punishment following citizen contribution choices. Untargeted citizens can then choose to help or hinder the authority. This latter choice may be interpreted as a behavioral measure of the authority's legitimacy. We find that legitimacy is affected by how authorities are compensated, the transparency with which their decisions are observed, and an interaction between these. When transparency is high, citizens are more willing to assist authorities who receive fixed salaries than those who personally benefit from collected penalties, even when citizens' material incentives are controlled for. Lower transparency reduces support, but only for salaried enforcers. |
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Time Period: |
2012-02-09-2012-07-16 |
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Date of Collection: |
2012-02-09-2012-07-16 |
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Notes: |
Version Date: 2014-02-26Version Text: 1.0 |
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Methodology and Processing |
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Sources Statement |
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Data Access |
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Notes: |
<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0">CC0 1.0</a> |
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Other Study Description Materials |
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Related Publications |
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Citation |
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Title: |
Dickson, Eric S., Sanford C. Gordon, and Gregory A. Huber. 2015. “Institutional Sources of Legitimate Authority: An Experimental Investigation.” <i>American Journal of Political Science</i> 59 (1): 109–27. doi:10.1111/ajps.12139. |
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Identification Number: |
10.1111/ajps.12139 |
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Bibliographic Citation: |
Dickson, Eric S., Sanford C. Gordon, and Gregory A. Huber. 2015. “Institutional Sources of Legitimate Authority: An Experimental Investigation.” <i>American Journal of Political Science</i> 59 (1): 109–27. doi:10.1111/ajps.12139. |
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Label: |
Dickson_Gordon_Huber_2014_replication_archive.zip |
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Text: |
Replication Archive Version 1.0 February 2014 gregory.huber@yale.edu This is the replication archive for "Institutional Sources of Legitimate Authority: An Experimental Investigation" Dickson, Gordon, Huber. AJPS, 2014. 01_CoreAnalysisFile.do is a stata .do file that performs all of the analysis that appears in the text, including generating all of the tables and figures. 02_PerformBalancetests.do is a stata .do file that performs the balance tests reported in the supplemental appendix. |
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Notes: |
application/zip |