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Part 1: Document Description
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Citation |
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Title: |
Replication data for: Dissolution Threats and Legislative Bargaining |
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Identification Number: |
doi:10.7910/DVN/26461 |
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Distributor: |
Harvard Dataverse |
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Date of Distribution: |
2014-06-11 |
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Version: |
2 |
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Bibliographic Citation: |
Becher, Michael; Christiansen, Flemming Juul, 2014, "Replication data for: Dissolution Threats and Legislative Bargaining", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/26461, Harvard Dataverse, V2 |
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Citation |
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Title: |
Replication data for: Dissolution Threats and Legislative Bargaining |
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Identification Number: |
doi:10.7910/DVN/26461 |
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Authoring Entity: |
Becher, Michael (University of Konstanz) |
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Christiansen, Flemming Juul (Roskilde University) |
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Producer: |
Michael Becher |
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Distributor: |
Harvard Dataverse |
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Access Authority: |
Michael Becher |
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Depositor: |
Michael Becher |
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Date of Deposit: |
2014-06-09 |
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Holdings Information: |
https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/26461 |
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Study Scope |
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Keywords: |
Social Sciences, Legislative politics, Coalition government, Confidence voting, Legislative veto, Dissolution of legislative bodies, Executive-legislative relations, Parliaments |
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Abstract: |
Chief executives in many parliamentary democracies have the power to dissolve the legislature. Despite a well-developed literature on the endogenous timing of parliamentary elections, political scientists know remarkably little about the strategic use of dissolution power to influence policy-making. To address this gap, we propose and empirically evaluate a theoretical model of legislative bargaining in the shadow of executive dissolution power. The model implies that the chief executive's public support and legislative strength as well as the time until the next constitutionally mandated election are important determinants of the use and effectiveness of dissolution threats in policy-making. Analyzing an original times-series data set from a multi-party parliamentary democracy, we find evidence in line with key empirical implications of the model. |
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Time Period: |
1974-2011 |
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Country: |
Denmark |
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Methodology and Processing |
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Sources Statement |
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Data Access |
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Notes: |
<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0">CC0 1.0</a> |
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Other Study Description Materials |
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Related Publications |
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Citation |
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Title: |
Becher, Michael, and Flemming Juul Christiansen. 2014. “Dissolution Threats and Legislative Bargaining.” <i>American Journal of Political Science</i> 59 (3): 641-655. |
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Identification Number: |
10.1111/ajps.12146 |
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Bibliographic Citation: |
Becher, Michael, and Flemming Juul Christiansen. 2014. “Dissolution Threats and Legislative Bargaining.” <i>American Journal of Political Science</i> 59 (3): 641-655. |
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Label: |
codebook.pdf |
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Text: |
This document briefly explains the variable codes used in the replication data set and code. |
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Notes: |
application/pdf |
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Label: |
dissthreats_code.R |
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Text: |
R code to generate the empirical tables and figures in the paper using the replication data set. |
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Notes: |
text/plain; charset=US-ASCII |
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Label: |
dissthreats_data.Rda |
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Text: |
Contains the data set used in the study. |
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Notes: |
application/warc |