The Political Economy of Bad Data: Evidence from African Survey and Administrative Statistics (doi:10.7910/DVN/26712)

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Part 2: Study Description
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Document Description

Citation

Title:

The Political Economy of Bad Data: Evidence from African Survey and Administrative Statistics

Identification Number:

doi:10.7910/DVN/26712

Distributor:

Harvard Dataverse

Date of Distribution:

2014-07-14

Version:

1

Bibliographic Citation:

Sandefur, Justin; Glassman, Amanda, 2014, "The Political Economy of Bad Data: Evidence from African Survey and Administrative Statistics", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/26712, Harvard Dataverse, V1

Study Description

Citation

Title:

The Political Economy of Bad Data: Evidence from African Survey and Administrative Statistics

Identification Number:

doi:10.7910/DVN/26712

Authoring Entity:

Sandefur, Justin (Center for Global Development)

Glassman, Amanda (Center for Global Development)

Producer:

Center for Global Development

Date of Production:

2014-07

Distributor:

Harvard Dataverse

Distributor:

Harvard Dataverse Network

Access Authority:

Justin Sandefur

Date of Deposit:

2014-07-14

Date of Distribution:

2014-07

Holdings Information:

https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/26712

Study Scope

Keywords:

national statistics systems, Africa, household surveys, immunization

Abstract:

Across multiple African countries, discrepancies between administrative data and independent household surveys suggest official statistics systematically exaggerate development progress. We provide evidence for two distinct explanations of these discrepancies. First, governments misreport to foreign donors, as in the case of a results-based aid program rewarding reported vaccination rates. Second, national governments are themselves misled by frontline service providers, as in the case of primary education, where official enrollment numbers diverged from survey estimates after funding shifted from user fees to per pupil government grants. Both syndromes highlight the need for incentive compatibility between data systems and funding rules.

Time Period:

1990-2012

Geographic Coverage:

Global

Geographic Unit(s):

Country

Methodology and Processing

Sources Statement

Data Access

Notes:

<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0">CC0 1.0</a>

Other Study Description Materials

Other Study-Related Materials

Label:

DTP3.dta

Text:

DPT3 coverage rates (DHS and WHO)

Notes:

application/x-stata

Other Study-Related Materials

Label:

Education DHS.dta

Text:

DHS enrollment rate data

Notes:

application/x-stata

Other Study-Related Materials

Label:

Education WDI.dta

Text:

WDI enrollment rate data

Notes:

application/x-stata

Other Study-Related Materials

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Education.do

Text:

Notes:

text/x-stata-syntax; charset=US-ASCII

Other Study-Related Materials

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Health.do

Text:

Notes:

text/x-stata-syntax; charset=US-ASCII

Other Study-Related Materials

Label:

Measles.dta

Text:

Measles coverage rates (DHS and WHO)

Notes:

application/x-stata

Other Study-Related Materials

Label:

README.txt

Text:

Notes:

text/plain; charset=US-ASCII