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Part 1: Document Description
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Citation |
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Title: |
Replication data for: The Time to Give: PAC Motivations and Electoral Timing |
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Identification Number: |
doi:10.7910/DVN/3LOTUL |
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Distributor: |
Harvard Dataverse |
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Date of Distribution: |
2010-02-16 |
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Version: |
1 |
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Bibliographic Citation: |
Nolan McCarty; Lawrence S. Rothenberg, 2010, "Replication data for: The Time to Give: PAC Motivations and Electoral Timing", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/3LOTUL, Harvard Dataverse, V1 |
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Citation |
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Title: |
Replication data for: The Time to Give: PAC Motivations and Electoral Timing |
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Identification Number: |
doi:10.7910/DVN/3LOTUL |
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Authoring Entity: |
Nolan McCarty (Columbia University) |
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Lawrence S. Rothenberg (University of Rochester) |
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Producer: |
Political Analysis |
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Date of Production: |
2000 |
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Distributor: |
Harvard Dataverse |
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Distributor: |
Murray Research Archive |
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Date of Deposit: |
2009 |
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Holdings Information: |
https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/3LOTUL |
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Study Scope |
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Abstract: |
There has been much discussion about how members of Congress desire money early in the campaign season. However, theoretical models of how contributions are allocated during the electoral cycle have been lacking. Our analysis attempts to remedy this gap by providing and testing a model which specifies how the process of bargaining between members of Congress and organized interests produces the pattern of donations observed over the course of the electoral cycle. Most notably, our results suggest that strategic incumbents can receive money early in the campaign if they desire but that they are generally unwilling to pay the price of lower aggregate fundraising and greater provision of access. These findings buttress earlier empirical findings that question the instrumental value of early money. In addition, our results highlight that contribution choices are fundamentally influenced by short-term factors, especially electoral conditions, that do not lend themselves to the routinized behavior necessary for contributors to invest in incumbents for long-run payoffs. |
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Methodology and Processing |
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Sources Statement |
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Data Access |
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Notes: |
<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0">CC0 1.0</a> |
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Other Study Description Materials |
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Related Publications |
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Citation |
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Title: |
Nolan McCarty and Lawrence S. Rothenberg. 2000. "The Time to Give: PAC Motivations and Electoral Timing." Political Analysis, 8:3, 239 - 259. <a href= "http://polmeth.wustl.edu/polanalysis/vol/8/PA83-239-259.pdf" target= "_new">article available here</a> |
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Bibliographic Citation: |
Nolan McCarty and Lawrence S. Rothenberg. 2000. "The Time to Give: PAC Motivations and Electoral Timing." Political Analysis, 8:3, 239 - 259. <a href= "http://polmeth.wustl.edu/polanalysis/vol/8/PA83-239-259.pdf" target= "_new">article available here</a> |
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Label: |
mcrothdata.zip |
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Text: |
Data and Codebook |
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Notes: |
application/zip |
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Label: |
mcrothextra.pdf |
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Text: |
Ancillary Tables and Figures |
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Notes: |
application/pdf |
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Label: |
TheTimetoGivePAC.pdf |
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Text: |
Published Article |
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Notes: |
application/pdf |