|
View: |
Part 1: Document Description
|
|
Citation |
|
|---|---|
|
Title: |
Replication Data for: Household Bargaining and Excess Fertility: An Experimental Study in Zambia |
|
Identification Number: |
doi:10.7910/DVN/6MSJHK |
|
Distributor: |
Harvard Dataverse |
|
Date of Distribution: |
2018-08-06 |
|
Version: |
1 |
|
Bibliographic Citation: |
Ashraf, Nava; Field, Erica; Lee, Jean, 2018, "Replication Data for: Household Bargaining and Excess Fertility: An Experimental Study in Zambia", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/6MSJHK, Harvard Dataverse, V1 |
|
Citation |
|
|
Title: |
Replication Data for: Household Bargaining and Excess Fertility: An Experimental Study in Zambia |
|
Identification Number: |
doi:10.7910/DVN/6MSJHK |
|
Authoring Entity: |
Ashraf, Nava (London School of Economics and Political Science) |
|
Field, Erica (Duke University) |
|
|
Lee, Jean (Millennium Challenge Corporation) |
|
|
Distributor: |
Harvard Dataverse |
|
Access Authority: |
Ashraf, Nava |
|
Access Authority: |
Field, Erica |
|
Access Authority: |
Lee, Jean |
|
Depositor: |
Parrado, Andres |
|
Date of Deposit: |
2018-07-09 |
|
Holdings Information: |
https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/6MSJHK |
|
Study Scope |
|
|
Keywords: |
Social Sciences |
|
Abstract: |
We posit that household decision-making over fertility is characterized by moral hazard since most contraception can only be perfectly observed by the woman. Using an experiment in Zambia that varied whether women were given access to contraceptives alone or with their husbands, we find that women given access with their husbands were 19 percent less likely to seek family planning services, 25 percent less likely to use concealable contraception, and 27 percent more likely to give birth. However, women given access to contraception alone report a lower subjective well-being, suggesting a psycho-social cost of making contraceptives more concealable. |
|
Methodology and Processing |
|
|
Sources Statement |
|
|
Data Access |
|
|
Notes: |
<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0">CC0 1.0</a> |
|
Other Study Description Materials |
|
|
Related Publications |
|
|
Citation |
|
|
Title: |
Ashraf, Nava, Erica Field, and Jean Lee. 2014. "Household Bargaining and Excess Fertility: An Experimental Study in Zambia." American Economic Review, 104 (7): 2210-37. |
|
Identification Number: |
10.1257/aer.104.7.2210 |
|
Bibliographic Citation: |
Ashraf, Nava, Erica Field, and Jean Lee. 2014. "Household Bargaining and Excess Fertility: An Experimental Study in Zambia." American Economic Review, 104 (7): 2210-37. |
|
Label: |
Household_Bargaining_Fertility_Replication.zip |
|
Text: |
Replication data. |
|
Notes: |
application/zip |