Replication Data for: Formal governance matters: when, how, and why states act on the IMF Executive Board (doi:10.7910/DVN/7N7LCH)

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Part 1: Document Description
Part 2: Study Description
Part 3: Data Files Description
Part 4: Variable Description
Part 5: Other Study-Related Materials
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Replication Data for: Formal governance matters: when, how, and why states act on the IMF Executive Board

doi:10.7910/DVN/7N7LCH

Harvard Dataverse

2025-01-17

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Forster, Timon; Honig, Dan; Kentikelenis, Alexandros, 2025, "Replication Data for: Formal governance matters: when, how, and why states act on the IMF Executive Board", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/7N7LCH, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:6:852QMrDOdj5wSH0bPJ+wPA== [fileUNF]

Replication Data for: Formal governance matters: when, how, and why states act on the IMF Executive Board

doi:10.7910/DVN/7N7LCH

Forster, Timon (University of St Gallen)

Honig, Dan (Georgetown University and University College London)

Kentikelenis, Alexandros (Bocconi University)

Harvard Dataverse

Forster, Timon

Forster, Timon

2025-01-15

https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/7N7LCH

Social Sciences, IMF Executive Board

International financial institutions (IFIs) are central actors shaping global development. Scholarship on these institutions’ governance has primarily explored unequal voting rights and informal channels of decision-making. Much less is known about the actual decision-making processes that transpire in the IFIs’ formal governance structures, where votes are rarely taken. This article redirects academic scrutiny to these structures to reveal hitherto unobserved state behavior. Empirically, we examine decision-making at the International Monetary Fund (IMF), a key actor in the diffusion of market-oriented reforms. We introduce a novel dataset systematizing all comments of IMF Executive Board members over 3,111 developing-country-specific discussions between 1995 and 2015. First, regression analysis reveals that the interventions by the IMF’s most powerful member-states—the United States, Germany, Japan, France, and the United Kingdom—correlate with their bilateral trade and aid interests. Second, these countries frequently reference each other in debates, demonstrating how coalitions work in practice. Third, we find that the preferences they express for market liberalization vis-à-vis countries in the Global South are associated with an increase in market-liberalizing conditions in subsequent lending programs. Taken together, this article reveals the usefulness of examining formal deliberations in IFIs, contributing to a fuller understanding of decision-making processes in the international political economy.

Forster, T., Honig, D., & Kentikelenis, A. (2025). Formal governance matters: when, how, and why states act on the IMF Executive Board. Review of International Political Economy, 1–29. https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2024.2441136

Forster, T., Honig, D., & Kentikelenis, A. (2025). Formal governance matters: when, how, and why states act on the IMF Executive Board. Review of International Political Economy, 1–29. https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2024.2441136

• Number of cases: 5

• No. of variables per record: 6

• Type of File: text/tab-separated-values

UNF:6:852QMrDOdj5wSH0bPJ+wPA==

Raw network data for G5 speaker references

• ccode - ccode
• USA - USA
• DEU - DEU
• JPN - JPN
• FRA - FRA
• GBR - GBR

f10825733 Location:

Variable Format: character

Notes: UNF:6:zOQ47rVtye6HDGW8ufhOOg==

f10825733 Location:

Summary Statistics: Min. 0.0; Max. 219.0; StDev 96.050507546811; Mean 146.8; Valid 5.0

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:YdOmKqjh7zidcaN23aMNqQ==

f10825733 Location:

Summary Statistics: Mean 74.8; StDev 53.07730211681826; Valid 5.0; Min. 0.0; Max. 120.0

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:NoyaQzs9+Qau9JnmGFDEzQ==

f10825733 Location:

Summary Statistics: Max. 51.0; StDev 20.43281674170255; Mean 36.0; Valid 5.0; Min. 0.0;

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:qX1pdaw+iFfM9jOBStpNow==

f10825733 Location:

Summary Statistics: Mean 110.8; Min. 0.0; Max. 257.0; Valid 5.0; StDev 100.55197660911494

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:I6DakyecBpr+BbxseL45kg==

f10825733 Location:

Summary Statistics: StDev 111.46165259855069; Max. 285.0; Valid 5.0; Min. 0.0; Mean 135.2

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:oU4CkLEIjjLRSWtaVNEM/w==

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Codebook_IMFEBM_November24.pdf

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Codebook 'IMF Executive Board Minutes Dataset, 1995-2015'

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dt_deterG5_controls_Nov24.rds

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Dataset with control variables for analysis: Determinants of participation

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dt_deterG5_Nov24.rds

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Full dataset with variables for analysis: Determinants of participation

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dt_predG5_controls_Nov24.rds

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Dataset with control variables for analysis: Conditionality and preferences for market liberalization

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dt_predG5_Nov24.rds

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Full dataset with variables for analysis: Conditionality and preferences for market liberalization

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EB_network_obj_Nov2024.rds

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Network object for G5 speaker references

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IMFEBM_Meeting_Nov2024_V1.rds

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Meeting-level data, 'IMF Executive Board Minutes Dataset, 1995-2015'

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IMFEBM_Speeches_Nov2024_V1.rds

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Text corpus with individual speeches, 'IMF Executive Board Minutes Dataset, 1995-2015'

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IMFEB_govtext_Nov24.rds

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Text-based indicators of state behavior in the IMF Executive Board

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IMFEB_RIPE_November2024_final.Rmd

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lemmatization-en.txt

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