School governance, teacher incentives, and pupil–teacher ratios: Experimental evidence from Kenyan primary schools (doi:10.7910/DVN/9534YA)

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Document Description

Citation

Title:

School governance, teacher incentives, and pupil–teacher ratios: Experimental evidence from Kenyan primary schools

Identification Number:

doi:10.7910/DVN/9534YA

Distributor:

Harvard Dataverse

Date of Distribution:

2016-02-17

Version:

1

Bibliographic Citation:

Duflo, Esther; Dupas, Pascaline; Kremer, Michael, 2016, "School governance, teacher incentives, and pupil–teacher ratios: Experimental evidence from Kenyan primary schools", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/9534YA, Harvard Dataverse, V1

Study Description

Citation

Title:

School governance, teacher incentives, and pupil–teacher ratios: Experimental evidence from Kenyan primary schools

Identification Number:

doi:10.7910/DVN/9534YA

Authoring Entity:

Duflo, Esther (MIT)

Dupas, Pascaline (Stanford University)

Kremer, Michael (Harvard University)

Software used in Production:

Stata

Grant Number:

7135425

Grant Number:

7135426

Distributor:

Harvard Dataverse

Access Authority:

Research Transparency, Data Ethics, and Governance

Depositor:

Research Support, Innovations for Poverty Action

Date of Deposit:

2015-02-17

Holdings Information:

https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/9534YA

Study Scope

Keywords:

Social Sciences, Education, Student-teacher ratio, Test scores, Teachers, Governance, Teacher performance

Abstract:

Some education policymakers focus on bringing down pupil–teacher ratios. Others argue that resources will have limited impact without systematic reforms to education governance, teacher incentives, and pedagogy. We examine a program under which school committees at randomly selected Kenyan schools were funded to hire an additional teacher on an annual contract renewable conditional on performance, outside normal Ministry of Education civil-service channels, at one-quarter normal compensation levels. For students randomly assigned to stay with existing classes, test scores did not increase significantly, despite a reduction in class size from 82 to 44 on average. In contrast, scores increased for students assigned to be taught by locally-hired contract teachers. One reason may be that contract teachers had low absence rates, while centrally-hired civil-service teachers in schools randomly assigned contract teachers endogenously reduced their effort. Civil-service teachers also captured rents for their families, with approximately 1/3 of contract teacher positions going to relatives of existing teachers. A governance program that empowered parents within school committees reduced both forms of capture. The best contract teachers obtained civil service jobs over time, and we estimate large potential dynamic benefits from supplementing a civil service system with locally-hired contract teachers brought in on a probationary basis and granted tenure conditional on performance.

Country:

Kenya

Geographic Coverage:

Western Province

Unit of Analysis:

Individual

Universe:

Students and teachers in primary schools where TSC teachers were teaching at the time of the study.

Kind of Data:

Survey data

Kind of Data:

Observational data

Methodology and Processing

Data Collector:

International Child Support (ICS)

Sampling Procedure:

In Western Kenya, 210 schools were randomly divided into a comparison group (70 schools), and an Estra Teacher Program (ETP) group (140 schools). Of these 140 schools, 70 were randomly assigned to the tracking program and are not the focus of this paper. Finally, 34 of the 70 non-tracking ETP schools were randomly selected to partcipate in SBM training.

Mode of Data Collection:

In-person interviews, In-class observations

Sources Statement

Data Access

Notes:

<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0">CC0 1.0</a>

Other Study Description Materials

Related Materials

http://web.stanford.edu/~pdupas/DDK_ETP.pdf

Other Study-Related Materials

Label:

ETP_ado_files.zip

Text:

User-written commands needed to run the code.

Notes:

application/zip

Other Study-Related Materials

Label:

ETP_Codebooks.zip

Text:

Contains codebooks of all variables by dataset.

Notes:

application/zip

Other Study-Related Materials

Label:

ETP_code_JPubE.do

Text:

Stata code used to produce the tables associated with "School governance, teacher incentives, and pupil–teacher ratios: Experimental evidence from Kenyan primary schools".

Notes:

application/x-stata-syntax

Other Study-Related Materials

Label:

ETP_Datasets.zip

Text:

Contains all datasets associated with the study.

Notes:

application/zip

Other Study-Related Materials

Label:

ETP_JPubE_Dataverse_Files.zip

Text:

Contains all files associated with the study (data, code, ado files, surveys, observation sheets, codebooks) in the proper folder structure, as well as Readme file.

Notes:

application/zip

Other Study-Related Materials

Label:

ETP_Surveys_Obs.zip

Text:

Contain all surveys and observation sheets used over the course of the study.

Notes:

application/zip

Other Study-Related Materials

Label:

READ_ME_ETP_JPubE.pdf

Text:

The readme document that accompanies the data and code. Contains information on how the data was constructed, the files needed to reproduce all tables, what is included in the data, and basic information about the study.

Notes:

application/pdf