Replication Data for: Mass Mobilization, Elite Competition, and Diversionary Use of Sanctions (doi:10.7910/DVN/9QQYPB)

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Part 1: Document Description
Part 2: Study Description
Part 3: Data Files Description
Part 4: Variable Description
Part 5: Other Study-Related Materials
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Document Description

Citation

Title:

Replication Data for: Mass Mobilization, Elite Competition, and Diversionary Use of Sanctions

Identification Number:

doi:10.7910/DVN/9QQYPB

Distributor:

Harvard Dataverse

Date of Distribution:

2024-10-30

Version:

1

Bibliographic Citation:

Liou, Ryan, 2024, "Replication Data for: Mass Mobilization, Elite Competition, and Diversionary Use of Sanctions", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/9QQYPB, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:6:TSOojF0HEi0tXP+B2L45ZQ== [fileUNF]

Study Description

Citation

Title:

Replication Data for: Mass Mobilization, Elite Competition, and Diversionary Use of Sanctions

Identification Number:

doi:10.7910/DVN/9QQYPB

Authoring Entity:

Liou, Ryan

Distributor:

Harvard Dataverse

Access Authority:

Liou, Ryan

Depositor:

Liou, Ryan

Date of Deposit:

2024-07-29

Holdings Information:

https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/9QQYPB

Study Scope

Keywords:

Social Sciences

Abstract:

How does the domestic environment affect a government’s incentives to use coercion against another country? Traditional diversionary literature indicates that governments facing internal pressures will initiate military actions overseas to improve popularity. I argue that struggling governments are more inclined to employ economic sanctions over military force because of lower cost and political risk. I further posit that when governments encounter nonviolent protests and strong competition in the legislature, they have more incentives to initiate sanctions. Foreign sanctions are used to project sanctioning leaders’ competence and solicit domestic support. I test the empirical implication of the argument on a sample of 137 countries from 1975 to 2005. The multinomial logit results show that diversionary use of sanctions is more likely when incumbents face maximalist nonviolent mobilization and higher legislative opposition, but these domestic challenges do not prompt military actions. This study indicates that economic coercion could be a preferred diversionary option and casts doubt on the conventional predictions that beleaguered governments will resort to the use of force.

Methodology and Processing

Sources Statement

Data Access

Other Study Description Materials

File Description--f10409367

File: DiversionarySanctions_GSDB.tab

  • Number of cases: 6484

  • No. of variables per record: 19

  • Type of File: text/tab-separated-values

Notes:

UNF:6:ORXbXu/41QFa1Sed1TJUUA==

File Description--f10409368

File: DiversionarySanctions_Main.tab

  • Number of cases: 5089

  • No. of variables per record: 19

  • Type of File: text/tab-separated-values

Notes:

UNF:6:dyvVP6c5Q8bx3tpiRr2STw==

Variable Description

List of Variables:

Variables

year

f10409367 Location:

Summary Statistics: Min. 1975.0; Valid 6484.0; StDev 11.19529896497217; Max. 2013.0; Mean 1994.5351634793337

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:raCwjWJEob6RlwMQ9krv9Q==

ccode

f10409367 Location:

Summary Statistics: Valid 6484.0; StDev 239.81851022104198; Max. 950.0; Mean 469.33035163481475; Min. 2.0

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:fgpl9mlcZTB/DSE9RJrdig==

0 = no sanction or militarized conflict, 1 = when a country imposes GSDB sanctio

f10409367 Location:

Summary Statistics: StDev 0.7146834239190533; Min. 0.0; Mean 0.3664404688463942; Valid 6484.0; Max. 2.0

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:QASX/VGQzjCo5i2DkqgVxw==

the country is under nonviolent campaigns at t-1

f10409367 Location:

Summary Statistics: Mean 0.05480724570366893; Max. 1.0; StDev 0.22762124924852828; Min. 0.0; Valid 6459.0;

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:Wzx3Qnq5TzlLgVvKKtnypw==

the country is under violent campaigns at t-1

f10409367 Location:

Summary Statistics: Valid 6459.0; StDev 0.3697023723204988; Min. 0.0; Max. 1.0; Mean 0.16333797801517355;

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:xwXdELpLL1PGrUf0mZO+EA==

opposition seat shareat t-1

f10409367 Location:

Summary Statistics: StDev 0.2213171659526212; Max. 1.0; Valid 5953.0; Mean 0.2340825412367848; Min. 0.0

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:UZcH2DgPO3TY6tjqCiCjJQ==

GDP growth rate at t-1

f10409367 Location:

Summary Statistics: Min. -64.04710388183594; Mean 3.7771628853764465; Valid 5526.0; StDev 6.602711734724093; Max. 149.97296142578125;

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:+UkT3PNZce2PnIeChwTFPw==

logged inflation at t-1

f10409367 Location:

Summary Statistics: Min. -6.593039512634277; Mean 3.3444097195001117; Max. 10.077073097229004; Valid 5036.0; StDev 0.5982362392695173

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:FT3PnMzah7nIetESmqJCZw==

legislative election at t+1

f10409367 Location:

Summary Statistics: Min. 0.0; StDev 0.4043394186960435; Mean 0.2058287795992705; Valid 6039.0; Max. 1.0

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:/pCa4nlgy8ZfBd669+tNPA==

executive election at t+1

f10409367 Location:

Summary Statistics: Max. 1.0; StDev 0.2973352301089983; Valid 6041.0; Mean 0.09799702036086959; Min. 0.0

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:iOrMuMs0hfDaBVrUu4TlFg==

logged GDP per capita at t-1

f10409367 Location:

Summary Statistics: Valid 5734.0; Mean 7.5980463583876094; Max. 11.698759078979492; StDev 1.5980389169867144; Min. 3.126556396484375;

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:thE4nrFRKAet+Yxgo2TtMg==

logged trade openness at t-1

f10409367 Location:

Summary Statistics: StDev 47.77853548840421; Mean 75.49163259799504; Min. 0.020999232307076454; Max. 437.32672119140625; Valid 5191.0;

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:KCRHgOm4W1f4LyRPMkAwWQ==

logged military spending at t-1

f10409367 Location:

Summary Statistics: Min. 0.0; StDev 3.0617938675537855; Valid 5898.0; Mean 12.61085922203051; Max. 20.357406616210938

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:qGOgecaKb1BxaaQEnmiYXQ==

Vdem electoral democracy index

f10409367 Location:

Summary Statistics: StDev 0.2900728715695455; Max. 0.924; Min. 0.013; Valid 6437.0; Mean 0.43825695199627135

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:2Q2zXU2frqV6zB87I8nDbw==

Fariss latent human rights score at t-1

f10409367 Location:

Summary Statistics: Min. -3.7673933506011963; Valid 6384.0; Mean -0.04905671091419378; StDev 1.5247926364734095; Max. 5.112534046173096;

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:97gTSU7/vtcueHpIftKydw==

coldwar

f10409367 Location:

Summary Statistics: Valid 6484.0; Min. 0.0; Mean 0.38510178901912373; StDev 0.48665688854298494; Max. 1.0

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:J4WRF34Pw285DtkAD+Rguw==

yrssince_divertgsdb

f10409367 Location:

Summary Statistics: Valid 6484.0; Min. 0.0; StDev 18.10774261565572; Max. 63.0; Mean 16.668414558914236

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:TioRSe42WdPYGHASP/8BTQ==

yrssince_divertsqgsdb

f10409367 Location:

Summary Statistics: StDev 951.5945925034897; Min. 0.0; Mean 605.6758173966709; Max. 3969.0; Valid 6484.0

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:t64LgjOxzBjJKE/O7xieeQ==

yrssince_divertcubicgsdb

f10409367 Location:

Summary Statistics: StDev 52124.85739015505; Max. 250047.0; Mean 26501.545650833217; Min. 0.0; Valid 6484.0

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:gHQnqwCNPXTTkeGSf1SjcA==

year

f10409368 Location:

Summary Statistics: StDev 8.942605958461236; Valid 5089.0; Max. 2005.0; Mean 1990.431518962468; Min. 1975.0;

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:us1p2fsRrHPECUUf+jy2dg==

ccode

f10409368 Location:

Summary Statistics: Mean 469.7826685006963; Max. 950.0; Min. 2.0; Valid 5089.0; StDev 240.81196246039326

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:EJFZT3+g8nayYthyTX2n8g==

0 = no sanction or militarized conflict, 1 = when a country imposes sanctions, a

f10409368 Location:

Summary Statistics: Valid 5089.0; Min. 0.0; Mean 0.3330713303202962; StDev 0.7154577106115971; Max. 2.0

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:lJqbd9CNpOHsoISHXXOrQg==

the country is under nonviolent campaigns at t-1

f10409368 Location:

Summary Statistics: Max. 1.0; Valid 5065.0; Min. 0.0; StDev 0.21163649217199895; Mean 0.04698914116485661

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:K8OUZwuTfiSoj8xvJlwwnA==

the country is under violent campaigns at t-1

f10409368 Location:

Summary Statistics: Valid 5065.0; Max. 1.0; Mean 0.1680157946692996; StDev 0.37391722530214083; Min. 0.0;

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:8mSGEf4Pio70BMzdF7mmJg==

opposition seat shareat t-1

f10409368 Location:

Summary Statistics: Mean 0.2152095639215135; Min. 0.0; StDev 0.22124841068891826; Max. 1.0; Valid 4623.0;

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:6GOPNMEs3ryPiPcQtmmrhw==

GDP growth rate at t-1

f10409368 Location:

Summary Statistics: StDev 6.878497976184691; Min. -64.04710388183594; Mean 3.585685550836471; Valid 4189.0; Max. 149.97296142578125;

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:8Gm9+CW3sdOUjLO0mGlkIA==

logged inflation at t-1

f10409368 Location:

Summary Statistics: StDev 0.6718348799685127; Min. -6.593039512634277; Valid 3750.0; Max. 10.077073097229004; Mean 3.402735684967041

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:KWUONYJBH4yy0EG9ZKeUJw==

legislative election at t+1

f10409368 Location:

Summary Statistics: Min. 0.0; Valid 4712.0; Mean 0.1992784380305598; Max. 1.0; StDev 0.39950020428291655;

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:HwBIqXzZOuWJ/bidgyfrBQ==

executive election at t+1

f10409368 Location:

Summary Statistics: Valid 4713.0; StDev 0.2885779384437617; Max. 1.0; Mean 0.0916613621896886; Min. 0.0;

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:mScK6IK4BqS9QfOu2RHLMA==

logged GDP per capita at t-1

f10409368 Location:

Summary Statistics: StDev 1.5410100269663825; Mean 7.362700553330404; Min. 3.126556396484375; Valid 4389.0; Max. 11.245633125305176

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:ScbsrVovlKCmjqQ0ysxXhw==

logged trade openness at t-1

f10409368 Location:

Summary Statistics: Min. 0.020999232307076454; Mean 71.84072308380969; Max. 410.936767578125; StDev 46.638278043469896; Valid 3946.0

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:MA0493nVFc367XPQDH+PKQ==

logged military spending at t-1

f10409368 Location:

Summary Statistics: Valid 4642.0; Min. 0.0; StDev 3.0946517559911335; Mean 12.44802857770431; Max. 19.937801361083984

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:i2S3ptTvMBZEWQXlsKKL0Q==

Vdem electoral democracy index

f10409368 Location:

Summary Statistics: Min. 0.013; Valid 5043.0; StDev 0.29158849315556307; Max. 0.923; Mean 0.41054074955383696

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:9OOuD2P7m0JkVh2b4sNmPg==

Fariss latent human rights score at t-1

f10409368 Location:

Summary Statistics: Max. 5.000085353851318; Min. -3.7673933506011963; Valid 5001.0; StDev 1.5209732229720367; Mean -0.15203099308336407;

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:x6Hz8ew3NgcEGjzwbUJW1A==

coldwar

f10409368 Location:

Summary Statistics: Max. 1.0; Mean 0.4906661426606404; Valid 5089.0; Min. 0.0; StDev 0.4999619957601425

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:K6J7Voriy5i5PECui6fcJg==

yrssince_divert

f10409368 Location:

Summary Statistics: StDev 16.80851341936044; Min. 0.0; Valid 5089.0; Max. 55.0; Mean 16.707604637453354

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:7W/rotcSfLjUXLYbyzquug==

yrssince_divertsq

f10409368 Location:

Summary Statistics: Valid 5089.0; Mean 561.6146590685771; Min. 0.0; StDev 792.44798419493; Max. 3025.0

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:Z5/feymvx6YwzLi6c7Zc9Q==

yrssince_divertcubic

f10409368 Location:

Summary Statistics: StDev 38301.95649341848; Mean 22138.501277264535; Min. 0.0; Max. 166375.0; Valid 5089.0

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:SZDCbdZqrFHzE6P6Fjg9tQ==

Other Study-Related Materials

Label:

Analysis_Diversionary Sanctions.do

Text:

Replication codes

Notes:

application/x-stata-syntax

Other Study-Related Materials

Label:

DiversionarySanctions Log.smcl

Text:

Log

Notes:

application/x-stata-smcl