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Part 1: Document Description
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Citation |
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Title: |
Replication data for: The Influence of Federal Spending on Presidential Elections |
Identification Number: |
doi:10.7910/DVN/CTQKJA |
Distributor: |
Harvard Dataverse |
Date of Distribution: |
2012-08-23 |
Version: |
2 |
Bibliographic Citation: |
Kriner, Douglas; Reeves, Andrew, 2012, "Replication data for: The Influence of Federal Spending on Presidential Elections", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/CTQKJA, Harvard Dataverse, V2 |
Citation |
|
Title: |
Replication data for: The Influence of Federal Spending on Presidential Elections |
Identification Number: |
doi:10.7910/DVN/CTQKJA |
Authoring Entity: |
Kriner, Douglas (Boston University) |
Reeves, Andrew (Boston University) |
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Producer: |
American Political Science Review |
Distributor: |
Harvard Dataverse |
Distributor: |
Harvard Dataverse |
Date of Deposit: |
2012-08-23 |
Holdings Information: |
https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/CTQKJA |
Study Scope |
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Keywords: |
Social Sciences, presidential elections |
Abstract: |
Do voters reward presidents for increased federal spending in their local constituencies? Previous research on the electoral consequences of federal spending has focused almost exclusively on Congress, mostly with null results. In a county- and individual-level study of presidential elections from 1988 to 2008, we present evidence that voters reward incumbent presidents (or their party's nominee) for increased federal spending in their communities. This relationship is stronger in battleground states. Furthermore, we show that federal grants are an electoral currency whose value depends on both the clarity of partisan responsibility for its provision and the characteristics of the recipients. Presidents enjoy increased support from spending in counties represented by co-partisan members of Congress. We also find that at the individual level ideology conditions the response of constituents to spending; liberal and moderate voters reward presidents for federal spending at higher levels than conservatives. Our results suggest that although voters may claim to favor deficit reduction, the presidents who deliver such benefits are rewarded at the ballot box. |
Time Period: |
1988-2008 |
Country: |
United States |
Geographic Unit(s): |
county |
Methodology and Processing |
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Sources Statement |
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Data Access |
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Notes: |
<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0">CC0 1.0</a> |
Other Study Description Materials |
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Related Publications |
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Citation |
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Title: |
Kriner, D., & Reeves, A. (2012). The Influence of Federal Spending on Presidential Elections. American Political Science Review, 106(2), 348-366. |
Identification Number: |
10.1017/S0003055412000159 |
Bibliographic Citation: |
Kriner, D., & Reeves, A. (2012). The Influence of Federal Spending on Presidential Elections. American Political Science Review, 106(2), 348-366. |
Label: |
Aggregate data.dta |
Text: |
replication data for county level analysis |
Notes: |
application/octet-stream |
Label: |
Aggregate level models.do |
Text: |
Stata do files for aggregate models |
Notes: |
text/x-stata-syntax; charset=US-ASCII |
Label: |
Gallup.dta |
Text: |
replication data for indiviudal-level results |
Notes: |
application/octet-stream |
Label: |
Individual level models.do |
Text: |
Stata do files for individual level results |
Notes: |
text/x-stata-syntax; charset=US-ASCII |