Replication data for: The Influence of Federal Spending on Presidential Elections (doi:10.7910/DVN/CTQKJA)

View:

Part 1: Document Description
Part 2: Study Description
Part 5: Other Study-Related Materials
Entire Codebook

(external link)

Document Description

Citation

Title:

Replication data for: The Influence of Federal Spending on Presidential Elections

Identification Number:

doi:10.7910/DVN/CTQKJA

Distributor:

Harvard Dataverse

Date of Distribution:

2012-08-23

Version:

2

Bibliographic Citation:

Kriner, Douglas; Reeves, Andrew, 2012, "Replication data for: The Influence of Federal Spending on Presidential Elections", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/CTQKJA, Harvard Dataverse, V2

Study Description

Citation

Title:

Replication data for: The Influence of Federal Spending on Presidential Elections

Identification Number:

doi:10.7910/DVN/CTQKJA

Authoring Entity:

Kriner, Douglas (Boston University)

Reeves, Andrew (Boston University)

Producer:

American Political Science Review

Distributor:

Harvard Dataverse

Distributor:

Harvard Dataverse

Date of Deposit:

2012-08-23

Holdings Information:

https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/CTQKJA

Study Scope

Keywords:

Social Sciences, presidential elections

Abstract:

Do voters reward presidents for increased federal spending in their local constituencies? Previous research on the electoral consequences of federal spending has focused almost exclusively on Congress, mostly with null results. In a county- and individual-level study of presidential elections from 1988 to 2008, we present evidence that voters reward incumbent presidents (or their party's nominee) for increased federal spending in their communities. This relationship is stronger in battleground states. Furthermore, we show that federal grants are an electoral currency whose value depends on both the clarity of partisan responsibility for its provision and the characteristics of the recipients. Presidents enjoy increased support from spending in counties represented by co-partisan members of Congress. We also find that at the individual level ideology conditions the response of constituents to spending; liberal and moderate voters reward presidents for federal spending at higher levels than conservatives. Our results suggest that although voters may claim to favor deficit reduction, the presidents who deliver such benefits are rewarded at the ballot box.

Time Period:

1988-2008

Country:

United States

Geographic Unit(s):

county

Methodology and Processing

Sources Statement

Data Access

Notes:

<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0">CC0 1.0</a>

Other Study Description Materials

Related Publications

Citation

Title:

Kriner, D., & Reeves, A. (2012). The Influence of Federal Spending on Presidential Elections. American Political Science Review, 106(2), 348-366.

Identification Number:

10.1017/S0003055412000159

Bibliographic Citation:

Kriner, D., & Reeves, A. (2012). The Influence of Federal Spending on Presidential Elections. American Political Science Review, 106(2), 348-366.

Other Study-Related Materials

Label:

Aggregate data.dta

Text:

replication data for county level analysis

Notes:

application/octet-stream

Other Study-Related Materials

Label:

Aggregate level models.do

Text:

Stata do files for aggregate models

Notes:

text/x-stata-syntax; charset=US-ASCII

Other Study-Related Materials

Label:

Gallup.dta

Text:

replication data for indiviudal-level results

Notes:

application/octet-stream

Other Study-Related Materials

Label:

Individual level models.do

Text:

Stata do files for individual level results

Notes:

text/x-stata-syntax; charset=US-ASCII