Replication data for: The Effects of Structures and Power on State Bargaining Strategies (doi:10.7910/DVN/E5ZSZR)

View:

Part 1: Document Description
Part 2: Study Description
Part 3: Data Files Description
Part 4: Variable Description
Part 5: Other Study-Related Materials
Entire Codebook

(external link)

Document Description

Citation

Title:

Replication data for: The Effects of Structures and Power on State Bargaining Strategies

Identification Number:

doi:10.7910/DVN/E5ZSZR

Distributor:

Harvard Dataverse

Date of Distribution:

2012-06-28

Version:

2

Bibliographic Citation:

McKibben, Heather Elko, 2012, "Replication data for: The Effects of Structures and Power on State Bargaining Strategies", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/E5ZSZR, Harvard Dataverse, V2, UNF:5:K8n7g914MEKmAjKDCD33pQ== [fileUNF]

Study Description

Citation

Title:

Replication data for: The Effects of Structures and Power on State Bargaining Strategies

Identification Number:

doi:10.7910/DVN/E5ZSZR

Authoring Entity:

McKibben, Heather Elko (University of California, Davis)

Producer:

Heather Elko McKibben

Distributor:

Harvard Dataverse

Access Authority:

Heather Elko McKibben

Depositor:

Heather Elko McKibben

Date of Deposit:

2012-06-15

Holdings Information:

https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/E5ZSZR

Study Scope

Keywords:

Social Sciences, Bargaining, Bargaining strategy, Negotiation, Negotiation strategy

Abstract:

When and why will states adopt more (or less) cooperative bargaining strategies? Standard answers to this question focus on the role of state power. Other scholars highlight socialization effects. I argue that in most international negotiations, the institutional bargaining structure will mitigate the effects of power and socialization, and drive state bargaining behavior. Factors highlighted by formal models of international bargaining should therefore best explain the variation in the strategies states adopt. I introduce empirical measures of these abstract concepts, and test their effects against those of power and socialization using an original dataset of state bargaining strategies in the European Union (EU). The results show that structural factors best explain variation in the EU states' bargaining strategies. I conclude by highlighting the conditions under which these effects should explain state bargaining behavior in other international negotiations, and discuss the implications of this argument for the study of international bargaining.

Time Period:

2004-2010

Date of Collection:

2005-2010

Geographic Coverage:

European Union

Methodology and Processing

Sources Statement

Data Access

Notes:

<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0">CC0 1.0</a>

Other Study Description Materials

Related Publications

Citation

Title:

McKibben, Heather Elko. 2013. “The Effects of Structures and Power on State Bargaining Strategies.” <i>American Journal of Political Science</i> 57 (2): 411–27.

Identification Number:

10.1111/j.1540-5907.2012.00628.x

Bibliographic Citation:

McKibben, Heather Elko. 2013. “The Effects of Structures and Power on State Bargaining Strategies.” <i>American Journal of Political Science</i> 57 (2): 411–27.

File Description--f2417092

File: McKibben_AJPS Bargaining Strategies data.tab

  • Number of cases: 588

  • No. of variables per record: 24

  • Type of File: text/tab-separated-values

Notes:

UNF:5:K8n7g914MEKmAjKDCD33pQ==

Stata dataset

Variable Description

List of Variables:

Variables

state

f2417092 Location:

Variable Format: character

Notes: UNF:5:Nrg2FqvgZaFa8GNPvdKGiw==

i_country

f2417092 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:5:5GY8U+7UV8TWO1Qx+xQ5uQ==

bargain

f2417092 Location:

Variable Format: character

Notes: UNF:5:xGBnWK5TlWtHAahtM2uK3w==

i_bargain

f2417092 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:5:5cYNnxISKraURIS31LtyIw==

dv

f2417092 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:5:xTnURXgvl4GaxEOY4Ruvsw==

lag_dv

f2417092 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:5:uCWfwNtRSQWdbjJtipgP4A==

lag_dv_alt0

f2417092 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:5:9YGbg7VimtF+ZSEo7eembA==

lag_dv_alt1

f2417092 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:5:dRJpSiUqWG3pmJfRqJdlBQ==

lag_dv_alt2

f2417092 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:5:tmTHrKUQWB/lxnk2UCnvCw==

lag_dv_alt3

f2417092 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:5:rC5VLsV/pduWGSqtdmmDwg==

agreement_importance

f2417092 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:5:PIZlVQ27qX4FAdXHvJLZIg==

voting_power

f2417092 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:5:jF4umZwgHw6GR5abfFuWkQ==

foreignpolicy

f2417092 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:5:GdXk/8bg6I0qhRjCAcLB8Q==

new_ms

f2417092 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:5:4Uh0Aw9N5K2Y2T6A6y/TSw==

qmv

f2417092 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:5:9IafdwfrJx/ljdMsFAHmgw==

euro

f2417092 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:5:CxHZS53HvOzOzn36GC5fQQ==

publicity

f2417092 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:5:I2o3htEY1kce88S1onnqIA==

presidency

f2417092 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:5:kENrR82zgBPIE3QEfBjKiQ==

lngdp

f2417092 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:5:LWxaIWnGQfeA2S/TxNShog==

pillari

f2417092 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:5:B0+V2/oAgJbcZxHOyOO0wA==

pillarii

f2417092 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:5:GdXk/8bg6I0qhRjCAcLB8Q==

pillariii

f2417092 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:5:OjTUDS/SQBWnkOfKJeiNnw==

parl_scrut

f2417092 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:5:+cS2h2CX4g0hwsr2hh9vxQ==

issue_linkage_structure

f2417092 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:5:GpZ+226rn3hiQgNeQEKN4Q==

Other Study-Related Materials

Label:

McKibben_AJPS Bargaining Strategies dofile.do

Text:

Stata dofile

Notes:

text/x-stata-syntax; charset=US-ASCII

Other Study-Related Materials

Label:

McKibben_AJPSCodebook.pdf

Text:

Codebook for key variables and description of cases

Notes:

application/pdf