Replication data for: Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War (doi:10.7910/DVN/EEXSJP)

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Part 1: Document Description
Part 2: Study Description
Part 3: Data Files Description
Part 4: Variable Description
Part 5: Other Study-Related Materials
Entire Codebook

Document Description

Citation

Title:

Replication data for: Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War

Identification Number:

doi:10.7910/DVN/EEXSJP

Distributor:

Harvard Dataverse

Date of Distribution:

2009-01-21

Version:

1

Bibliographic Citation:

Puth Huth, 2009, "Replication data for: Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/EEXSJP, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:3:kwO8JYIO8ZQqUyrEQ6z/HQ== [fileUNF]

Study Description

Citation

Title:

Replication data for: Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War

Identification Number:

doi:10.7910/DVN/EEXSJP

Authoring Entity:

Puth Huth (University of Michigan)

Date of Production:

1988

Distributor:

Harvard Dataverse

Distributor:

Puth Huth

Distributor:

Murray Research Archive

Date of Deposit:

2007

Date of Distribution:

2007

Holdings Information:

https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/EEXSJP

Study Scope

Abstract:

Successful deterrence, it is argued, requires a combination of military capabilities and bargaining behavior that enhances a defender's credibility without provoking a potential attacker. Hypotheses on the political and military conditions under which extended-immediate deterrence is likely to succeed or fail are formulated and tested by probit analysis on fifty-eight historical cases. The empirical results indicate that (1) the military capability of the defender to deny the potential attacker a quick and decisive victory on the battlefield enhances deterrence; (2) a policy of reciprocity in diplomacy and military actions by the defender contributes strongly to deterrence success; and (3) a past record of backing down under pressure or intransigence in confrontations with the potential attacker increases the likelihood of deterrence failure.

Notes:

Subject: STANDARD DEPOSIT TERMS 1.0 Type: DATAPASS:TERMS:STANDARD:1.0 Notes: This study was deposited under the of the Data-PASS standard deposit terms. A copy of the usage agreement is included in the file section of this study.;

Methodology and Processing

Sources Statement

Data Access

Notes:

<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0">CC0 1.0</a>

Other Study Description Materials

Related Publications

Citation

Title:

Huth, Paul. "Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War" The American Political Science Review, Vol. 82, No. 2 (Jun., 1988), pp. 423-443 doi:10.2307/1957394. <a href="http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554(198912)83%3A4%3C1448%3AEDATPO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-9 " target= "_new"> article available here </a>

Bibliographic Citation:

Huth, Paul. "Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War" The American Political Science Review, Vol. 82, No. 2 (Jun., 1988), pp. 423-443 doi:10.2307/1957394. <a href="http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554(198912)83%3A4%3C1448%3AEDATPO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-9 " target= "_new"> article available here </a>

File Description--f110613

File: Ext_det.tab

  • Number of cases: 58

  • No. of variables per record: 17

  • Type of File: text/tab-separated-values

Notes:

UNF:3:kwO8JYIO8ZQqUyrEQ6z/HQ==

Stata file for this study

Variable Description

List of Variables:
  • id
  • det_suc - Outcome of each case of attempt
  • imbalfor - Immediate balance of forces
  • stbalfor - Short term balance of forces
  • ltbalfor - Long term balance of forces
  • nuke - Defender possession of nuclear
  • alliance - Military alliance between defen
  • arms_xfr - Arms imports by protege from de
  • for_trde - Protege's % share of defender's
  • fbf - Firm-but-Flexible diplomatic st
  • tft - Tit-for-Tat policy of military
  • putdn - Diplomatic put-down by defender
  • stale - Stalemate by defender in most r
  • pdip_def - Diplomatic defeat for defender
  • pdet_suc - Diplomatic success for defender
  • capit - Deterrence fails and defender d
  • arm_spt - Deterrence fails and defender d

Variables

id

f110613 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:fajls0uL4wUxUYqsu8N7oA==

Outcome of each case of attempt

f110613 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:pnqhozU/gJ/CMhmPfGgmoQ==

Immediate balance of forces

f110613 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:/mfbhJ8ZjUZ0nU8TI4/Uxw==

Short term balance of forces

f110613 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:00Qcm1qOKj8Uh3f20TtYUg==

Long term balance of forces

f110613 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:hABOBLrJptvi8wGj42nF3g==

Defender possession of nuclear

f110613 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:qOBJREMS8BTqLj05Emf3bA==

Military alliance between defen

f110613 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:D27cZvPniPDlHgNJmOlfLQ==

Arms imports by protege from de

f110613 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:XnQOy9hMZfvup3QVAJzgrQ==

Protege's % share of defender's

f110613 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:o0BoNJjPrfuimluzAnOQkQ==

Firm-but-Flexible diplomatic st

f110613 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:PJKRKKhyAN05fqbGQtW68g==

Tit-for-Tat policy of military

f110613 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:MphJxNwgD12Tjg4T0WA22Q==

Diplomatic put-down by defender

f110613 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:qiCGJuLN+p8WT/LQzZbu+A==

Stalemate by defender in most r

f110613 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:CREEYHeRwP/B4TFXwnA0DQ==

Diplomatic defeat for defender

f110613 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:Cn92WfEZ60PiWe1zwEXP2w==

Diplomatic success for defender

f110613 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:YAaanS+oo3x5DH8Mzo0gCQ==

Deterrence fails and defender d

f110613 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:K34x9+ifytLLFlVMDKxlEQ==

Deterrence fails and defender d

f110613 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:p7TpM+3SGdj+7JPAVQNeJQ==

Other Study-Related Materials

Label:

ext_det.zip

Text:

Zip file containing data for this study in original file format

Notes:

application/x-zip-compressed