Replication Data for: Good Governance in Poor Places: Explaining Inclusive Politics in Emerging Subnational Democracies (doi:10.7910/DVN/H5A72B)

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Replication Data for: Good Governance in Poor Places: Explaining Inclusive Politics in Emerging Subnational Democracies

doi:10.7910/DVN/H5A72B

Harvard Dataverse

2019-12-10

1

Phillips, Jonathan, 2019, "Replication Data for: Good Governance in Poor Places: Explaining Inclusive Politics in Emerging Subnational Democracies", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/H5A72B, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:6:cLkleVFx/AxltS/Q64AleA== [fileUNF]

Replication Data for: Good Governance in Poor Places: Explaining Inclusive Politics in Emerging Subnational Democracies

doi:10.7910/DVN/H5A72B

Phillips, Jonathan (Harvard University)

Department of Government

R

156069

34311

Harvard Dataverse

Department of Government

Wall, Thom

Phillips, Jonathan

2017-05-11

https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/H5A72B

Social Sciences, Comparative Politics, Political Economy, Clientelism, Programmatic Politics, Federalism

Harvard University, Department of Government

The terms on which citizens of emerging democracies access public resources are often skewed by their economic vulnerability, making them dependent on clientelist relationships and suppressing their political autonomy. To what extent is this clientelist trap of selective exclusion an inevitable feature of democracy in poor places? This dissertation takes inspiration from three `least-likely' subnational cases of inclusive good governance amid extreme poverty. To explain why elites unexpectedly pursue impersonal, inclusive policies and how voters defy the clientelist trap to re-elect them, the analysis combines formal theory, multiple household surveys and subnational comparisons spanning Brazil, India and Nigeria. The evidence suggests that inclusive governance is an attractive strategy for `outsider' leaders with relatively weak clientelist networks who are threatened by competing clientelist elites. Using the state apparatus for inclusive rule enforcement prevents clientelist discretion, starving competitors of rents and support from clientelism, and helping to secure the outsider's political authority. These incentives are likely to arise even in poor clientelist places where outsiders are elevated to power by national actors seeking to bring to office local allies. <br /><br /> Whether voters can escape the clientelist trap to re-elect the outsider reformer depends on their ability to coordinate; on their collective confidence in the reformer's performance. Delivering large public benefits can provide a crucial coordinating device in anchoring expectations that other voters will reject clientelism. However, voters' ability to generate collective confidence may be impaired if resurgent clientelist competitors intensify their threats or use disinformation tactics such as rumours of corruption to undermine the reputation of the inclusive incumbent. Mitigating these threats relies on supportive national financing and the ability to monopolize the media or coopt clientelist elites. The consolidation of inclusive governance is also aided by national inclusive policies that constrain the supply of local clientelist goods and create a demand for inclusive governance by insulating voters' incomes from political interference. However, national policy may only be effective where it complements local reform. <br /><br /> These arguments demonstrate that inclusive governance does not depend on economic development or externally-mobilized parties. Even the poorest societies can extend full citizenship rights and equitable policy access to their members. The unpredictability and competition of subnational politics provides alternative motives for elites to introduce governance reform, and new opportunities for voters to rally against clientelism.

2014-06-01-2017-05-06

2014-06-01-2017-05-06

Brazil, Brazil, Brazil, India, India, Nigeria

Ceara, Alagoas, Bahia, Bihar, Jharkhand, Ekiti

Individuals

Replication data for dissertation

This study was deposited under the of the Data-PASS standard deposit terms. A copy of the usage agreement is included in the file section of this study.

<b>The data archived in the Harvard Government Dissertation Dataverse are restricted for use for five years post deposit date.</b> I will use these data solely for the purposes stated in my application to use data, detailed in a written research proposal.

I will include a bibliographic citation acknowledging the use of these data in any publication or presentation in which these data are used. Such citations will appear in footnotes or in the reference section of any such manuscript. I understand the guideline in "How to Cite This Dataset" described in the Summary of this study.

The data are available without additional conditions other than those stated in the "Restrictions" Terms of Use above.

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Embargoed

Phillips, Jonathan, "Good Governance in Poor Places: Explaining Inclusive Politics in Emerging Subnational Democracies", Harvard University

Phillips, Jonathan, "Good Governance in Poor Places: Explaining Inclusive Politics in Emerging Subnational Democracies", Harvard University

• Number of cases: 4862

• No. of variables per record: 585

• Type of File: text/tab-separated-values

UNF:6:Lb0U/VH8i/5Y9dHjgs6lyQ==

Household Survey Data from 4km either side of Bihar-Jharkhand Border, India, 2016

• Number of cases: 1972

• No. of variables per record: 255

• Type of File: text/tab-separated-values

UNF:6:vmjTgyb9qERbMDmL0JAO4w==

Household Survey Data from Alagoas, Bahia and Ceara, Brazil, 2017

• Number of cases: 396

• No. of variables per record: 286

• Type of File: text/tab-separated-values

UNF:6:VYpH3NKneYixAkX83OJeew==

Household Survey Data from Ekiti State, Nigeria, 2014

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Bihar XLSForm.xls

Text:

XLSForm Questionnaire for SurveyCTO (ODK) for Bihar-Jharkhand Border Survey

application/vnd.ms-excel

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Questionnaire XLSForm Ekiti.xls

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XLSForm Questionnaire for SurveyCTO (ODK) Survey in Ekiti State, Nigeria, 2014

application/vnd.ms-excel

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XLSForm Alagoas.xls

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Questionnaire XLSForm for Brazil Survey, Alagoas State, 2017

application/vnd.ms-excel

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XLSForm Bahia.xls

Text:

Questionnaire XLSForm for Bahia State, Brazil, 2017

application/vnd.ms-excel

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XLSForm Ceara.xls

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Questionnaire XLSForm for Ceara State, Brazil, 2017

application/vnd.ms-excel