Does Corruption Information Inspire the Fight or Quash the Hope? A Field Experiment in Mexico on Voter Turnout, Choice, and Party Identification (doi:10.7910/DVN/KJABMA)

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Document Description

Citation

Title:

Does Corruption Information Inspire the Fight or Quash the Hope? A Field Experiment in Mexico on Voter Turnout, Choice, and Party Identification

Identification Number:

doi:10.7910/DVN/KJABMA

Distributor:

Harvard Dataverse

Date of Distribution:

2020-02-24

Version:

1

Bibliographic Citation:

Chang, Alberto; De La O, Ana L.; Karlan, Dean; Wantchekon, Leonard, 2020, "Does Corruption Information Inspire the Fight or Quash the Hope? A Field Experiment in Mexico on Voter Turnout, Choice, and Party Identification", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/KJABMA, Harvard Dataverse, V1

Study Description

Citation

Title:

Does Corruption Information Inspire the Fight or Quash the Hope? A Field Experiment in Mexico on Voter Turnout, Choice, and Party Identification

Identification Number:

doi:10.7910/DVN/KJABMA

Authoring Entity:

Chang, Alberto (University of Ottowa)

De La O, Ana L. (Yale University)

Karlan, Dean (Northwestern University)

Wantchekon, Leonard (Princeton University)

Software used in Production:

STATA

Distributor:

Harvard Dataverse

Access Authority:

Research Transparency, Data Ethics, and Governance

Depositor:

Research Transparency, Data Ethics, and Governance, Innovations for Poverty Action

Date of Deposit:

2020-02-10

Holdings Information:

https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/KJABMA

Study Scope

Keywords:

Social Sciences, Incumbents, Political corruption, Government corruption, Voting, Voting precincts, Data corruption, Mayors, Political parties, Placebos, Political candidates

Abstract:

Retrospective voting models assume that offering more information to voters about their incumbents’ performance strengthens electoral accountability. However, it is unclear whether incumbent corruption information translates into higher political participation and increased support for challengers. We provide experimental evidence that such information not only decreases incumbent party support in local elections in Mexico, but also decreases voter turnout and support for the challenger party, as well as erodes partisan attachments. While information clearly is necessary to improve accountability, corruption information is not sufficient because voters may respond to it by withdrawing from the political process. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings for studies of voting behavior.

Country:

Mexico, Mexico, Mexico

Geographic Coverage:

Jalisco, Morelos, Tabasco

Unit of Analysis:

Precinct-level

Universe:

Precincts with municipal elections.

Kind of Data:

Precinct level data, demographic baseline characteristics data and survey data.

Methodology and Processing

Data Collector:

Innovations for Poverty Action and two local firms with experience in leafleting.

Sampling Procedure:

'In each state, we selected all municipalities audited by ASF the previous year. This criterion, which was necessary because our information campaign relied on the availability of audit reports, left us with 12 municipalities, including three state capitals and nine municipalities of varying levels of development. 9 Table 1 lists the 12 municipalities in our study. In each municipality, we assigned all voting precincts to one of our four treatment conditions. The total number of voting precincts in our study is 2,360. We used block randomization, stratified on municipality, to assign our treatments.

Mode of Data Collection:

Audit reports, electoral results and in-person surveys.

Sources Statement

Data Access

Notes:

<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0">CC0 1.0</a>

Other Study Description Materials

Other Study-Related Materials

Label:

Mexico Municipal Elections - Dataverse Files.zip

Text:

This folder contains all the files necessary to replicate the results in the publication.

Notes:

application/zip