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Part 1: Document Description
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Citation |
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Title: |
Replication Data for: Domestic Institutions, Geographic Concentration, and Agricultural Liberalization |
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Identification Number: |
doi:10.7910/DVN/KYPBRP |
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Distributor: |
Harvard Dataverse |
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Date of Distribution: |
2025-03-24 |
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Version: |
1 |
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Bibliographic Citation: |
Kim, In Song; Naoi, Megumi; Sasaki, Tomoya, 2025, "Replication Data for: Domestic Institutions, Geographic Concentration, and Agricultural Liberalization", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/KYPBRP, Harvard Dataverse, V1 |
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Citation |
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Title: |
Replication Data for: Domestic Institutions, Geographic Concentration, and Agricultural Liberalization |
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Identification Number: |
doi:10.7910/DVN/KYPBRP |
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Authoring Entity: |
Kim, In Song (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) |
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Naoi, Megumi (University of California, San Diego) |
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Sasaki, Tomoya (Independent Scholar) |
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Distributor: |
Harvard Dataverse |
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Distributor: |
Harvard Dataverse |
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Access Authority: |
Tomoya Sasaki |
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Depositor: |
Kim, In Song |
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Date of Deposit: |
2025-01-09 |
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Holdings Information: |
https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/KYPBRP |
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Study Scope |
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Keywords: |
Social Sciences, parliamentary and presidential system, agricultural protection, trade compensation, trade liberalization, remote-sensed data, Japan and the United States |
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Abstract: |
One of the persistent obstacles to trade liberalization is a government’s inability to commit and deliver compensation to trade losers. We argue that constitutional structures interact with the geographic profiles of industries to shape a government’s ability to commit to a compensation contract, defined as an interbranch contract whereby an executive branch promises compensation in exchange for legislative support for ratification. Our theory predicts that parliamentary systems are more likely to liberalize and compensate geographically concentrated industries because party leaders enforce a contract with a smaller number of legislators. Presidential systems are more likely to liberalize and compensate geographically diffused industries because legislature enforces a contract with a larger number of legislators. Using novel product-level data on agricultural trade liberalization and remote-sensed cropland in 38 democracies, we find evidence consistent with our argument. Qualitative studies of the sugar industry and interviews with policymakers provide further evidence. |
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Notes: |
<strong>APSR Data Editors' Note:</strong> APSR Data Editors have reviewed included documentation for completeness and have successfully reproduced all figures and tables in the article using the code and data included in this deposit. Data editors do not review results presented in appendices or supplementary materials. |
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Methodology and Processing |
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Sources Statement |
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Data Access |
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Notes: |
This dataset not to be distributed/posted outside of the Harvard Dataverse. All downloads should take place directly on Harvard Dataverse to ensure data integrity. |
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Other Study Description Materials |
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Related Publications |
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Citation |
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Title: |
KIM, IN SONG, MEGUMI NAOI, and TOMOYA SASAKI. 2025. “Domestic Institutions, Geographic Concentration, and Agricultural Liberalization.” American Political Science Review: 1–17. |
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Identification Number: |
10.1017/S0003055425000127 |
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Bibliographic Citation: |
KIM, IN SONG, MEGUMI NAOI, and TOMOYA SASAKI. 2025. “Domestic Institutions, Geographic Concentration, and Agricultural Liberalization.” American Political Science Review: 1–17. |
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Label: |
replication.zip |
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Notes: |
application/zip |