Replication Data for: Making International Organizations Work: The Politics of Institutional Performance (doi:10.7910/DVN/LJBKNA)

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Replication Data for: Making International Organizations Work: The Politics of Institutional Performance

doi:10.7910/DVN/LJBKNA

Harvard Dataverse

2019-12-10

1

Lall, Ranjit, 2019, "Replication Data for: Making International Organizations Work: The Politics of Institutional Performance", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/LJBKNA, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:6:ReSldxMO2w1J8TXfIdCVYQ== [fileUNF]

Replication Data for: Making International Organizations Work: The Politics of Institutional Performance

doi:10.7910/DVN/LJBKNA

Lall, Ranjit (Harvard University)

Department of Government

Harvard Dataverse

Department of Government

Wall, Tom

Lall, Ranjit

2017-12-15

https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/LJBKNA

Social Sciences, international organizations

Harvard University, Department of Government

International organizations (IOs) have emerged in recent decades as among the most important and influential actors in world politics. Surprisingly, however, we continue to know little about their performance – that is, the extent to which they achieve their objectives and do so in a manner that is cost-effective and responsive to a wide range of public and private stakeholders. This dissertation seeks to address two key questions: Why do some IOs tend to perform better than others? And what are the consequences of such differences?<br /><br /> The first part of the study explores the sources of variation in IO performance. I argue that the primary obstacle to effective performance is not opportunistic behavior by IO officials – as implied by conventional “rogue-agency” analyses – but the propensity of states to use IOs to advance narrow national interests at the expense of broader organizational goals. The implication is that IOs that enjoy policy autonomy vis-à-vis states will exhibit higher levels of performance. Critically, however, I posit that in the international context policy autonomy cannot be guaranteed by institutional design. Instead, it is a function of (1) the existence of operational alliances between IOs and actors above and below the state; and (2) the technical complexity of IO activities. I provide evidence for the argument by constructing and analyzing the first quantitative dataset on IO performance – based in part on a new wave of government evaluations of IOs and in part on an original survey of IO staff – and by conducting a comparative case study in the area of global food security. <br /><br /> The second part of the dissertation examines how variation in performance affects two significant characteristics of IOs, namely, their level of funding and accountability. I develop a theoretical framework that highlights how different aspects of the relationship between IOs and other actors within their policy space mediate the impact of such variation. Two aspects of this relationship are particularly important: (1) the degree of competition IOs face from institutions that exercise similar functions to them; and (2) the robustness of operational alliances between IOs and nonstate actors. Similarly to before, I test the argument using a mixed-methods approach, combining qualitative evidence from extensive interviews and other sources with a series of observational and quasi-experimental statistical analyses based on original panel data on organizational funding and accountability mechanisms.<br /><br /> In sum, the dissertation addresses a significant gap in the international relations literature by offering a systematic theoretical and empirical examination of the politics of IO performance. In doing so, it contributes to several strands of research on IOs – including those on institutional design, delegation, autonomy, nonstate actors, and accountability – as well as to broader ongoing debates about institutions, power, information, and change in world politics.

international organizations

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Lall, Ranjit. 2017. Making International Organizations Work: The Politics of Institutional Performance. Dissertation, Harvard University.

Lall, Ranjit. 2017. Making International Organizations Work: The Politics of Institutional Performance. Dissertation, Harvard University.

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