Replication Data for: After a Storm Come Votes: Identifying the Effects of Disaster Relief on Electoral Outcomes (doi:10.7910/DVN/N5HRDP)

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Part 2: Study Description
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Document Description

Citation

Title:

Replication Data for: After a Storm Come Votes: Identifying the Effects of Disaster Relief on Electoral Outcomes

Identification Number:

doi:10.7910/DVN/N5HRDP

Distributor:

Harvard Dataverse

Date of Distribution:

2024-01-07

Version:

1

Bibliographic Citation:

Fukumoto, Kentaro; Kikuta, Kyosuke, 2024, "Replication Data for: After a Storm Come Votes: Identifying the Effects of Disaster Relief on Electoral Outcomes", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/N5HRDP, Harvard Dataverse, V1

Study Description

Citation

Title:

Replication Data for: After a Storm Come Votes: Identifying the Effects of Disaster Relief on Electoral Outcomes

Identification Number:

doi:10.7910/DVN/N5HRDP

Authoring Entity:

Fukumoto, Kentaro (Gakushuin University)

Kikuta, Kyosuke (Institute of Developing Economies)

Distributor:

Harvard Dataverse

Access Authority:

Kikuta, Kyosuke

Depositor:

Kikuta, Kyosuke

Date of Deposit:

2024-01-06

Holdings Information:

https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/N5HRDP

Study Scope

Keywords:

Social Sciences

Abstract:

The retrospective voting theory suggests that citizens vote for governing parties in response to distributive benefits. Knowing this, governments may reward voters by providing particularistic benefits—i.e., pork—prior to elections. Previous studies, however, do not account for the endogeneity. We address this problem by focusing on disaster relief and exploiting exogeneity of disaster. In particular, by using maximum hourly rainfall as an instrumental variable for disaster relief, we analyze the causal effect of disaster relief on incumbent’s electoral outcomes. Our analyses of Japanese data in the past few decades indicate that disaster relief increased governing parties’ vote share. Specifically, when the disaster relief per capita increases from zero to its mean, the predicted value of the governing parties’ vote share increases by 2.8 and 5.4% points in the lower and upper chambers, respectively. The finding is consistent with retrospective voting behavior. Moreover, our results imply that the incumbent’s electoral gain is brought about by persuading voters from oppositions to governing parties rather than by mobilizing supporters of governing parties.

Notes:

This is a replication file for "After a Storm Come Votes: Identifying the Effects of Disaster Relief on Electoral Outcomes"

Methodology and Processing

Sources Statement

Data Access

Other Study Description Materials

Related Publications

Citation

Title:

Fukumoto, Kentaro and Kyosuke Kikuta. (2024). "After a Storm Come Votes: Identifying the Effects of Disaster Relief on Electoral Outcomes." Political Behavior (46): 2357–2377.

Bibliographic Citation:

Fukumoto, Kentaro and Kyosuke Kikuta. (2024). "After a Storm Come Votes: Identifying the Effects of Disaster Relief on Electoral Outcomes." Political Behavior (46): 2357–2377.

Other Study-Related Materials

Label:

fukumoto_kikuta_PB.zip

Notes:

application/zipped-shapefile