Replication data for: Organizational Structure and the Optimal Design of Policymaking Panels: Evidence from Consensus Group Commission's Revenue Forecasts in the American States (doi:10.7910/DVN/NMJAFC)

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Replication data for: Organizational Structure and the Optimal Design of Policymaking Panels: Evidence from Consensus Group Commission's Revenue Forecasts in the American States

doi:10.7910/DVN/NMJAFC

Harvard Dataverse

2012-07-27

2

Krause, George A.; Douglas. James W., 2012, "Replication data for: Organizational Structure and the Optimal Design of Policymaking Panels: Evidence from Consensus Group Commission's Revenue Forecasts in the American States", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/NMJAFC, Harvard Dataverse, V2

Replication data for: Organizational Structure and the Optimal Design of Policymaking Panels: Evidence from Consensus Group Commission's Revenue Forecasts in the American States

doi:10.7910/DVN/NMJAFC

Krause, George A. (University of Georgia)

Douglas. James W. (University of North Carolina-Charlotte)

George A. Krause

James W. Douglas

Harvard Dataverse

George Krause

George Krause

2012-06-28

https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/NMJAFC

Social Sciences, Organizational diversity, Group decision making, Structural design

Increasing both the size and diversity of policymaking panels is widely thought to enhance the accuracy of collective policy decisions. This study advances the theoretical conditions in which improving collective accuracy necessitates an efficient tradeoff between a panel’s size and its level of organizational diversity. This substitution effect between these organizational characteristics is empirically supported with data on official general fund revenue forecasts made by consensus group (CG) independent commissions in the American states. Evidence of an asymmetric substitution effect is also uncovered, whereby increasing organizational diversity in large CG commissions produces revenue forecasts that reduce collective accuracy by slightly more than three times as much compared to decreasing such diversity in small CG commissions. This study underscores the limits of organizational diversity as a mechanism for improving collective judgments when policymaking authority is diffuse among many panel members.

United States

American States

Version Date: 2012-05-17Version Text: Final AJPS Accepted Version

<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0">CC0 1.0</a>

Krause, George A., and James W. Douglas. 2013. “Organizational Structure and the Optimal Design of Policymaking Panels: Evidence from Consensus Group Commissions’ Revenue Forecasts in the American States.” <i>American Journal of Political Science</i> 57 (1): 135–49.

10.1111/j.1540-5907.2012.00614.x

Krause, George A., and James W. Douglas. 2013. “Organizational Structure and the Optimal Design of Policymaking Panels: Evidence from Consensus Group Commissions’ Revenue Forecasts in the American States.” <i>American Journal of Political Science</i> 57 (1): 135–49.

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Organizational Structure.AJPS Replication Materials.05-14-2012.7z

Text:

Replication Archive File Folder Contains (1) 1 Data/Variable Codebook File (*.pdf); (2) 1 STATA Data File (*.dta); (3) 2 STATA Program Code Files: 1 for Non-Sample Selection Models & 1 for Sample Selection Models (*.do); (4) 2 STATA Output Files: 1 for Non-Sample Selection Models & 1 for Sample Selection Models (*.smcl)

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