Are All Legal Probabilities Created Equal? (doi:10.7910/DVN/NMWITM)

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Part 1: Document Description
Part 2: Study Description
Part 3: Data Files Description
Part 4: Variable Description
Part 5: Other Study-Related Materials
Entire Codebook

Document Description

Citation

Title:

Are All Legal Probabilities Created Equal?

Identification Number:

doi:10.7910/DVN/NMWITM

Distributor:

Harvard Dataverse

Date of Distribution:

2009-06-12

Version:

1

Bibliographic Citation:

Yuval Feldman; Doron Teichman, 2009, "Are All Legal Probabilities Created Equal?", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/NMWITM, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:3:er9eYzxHpgaOJn5fQnKNfw== [fileUNF]

Study Description

Citation

Title:

Are All Legal Probabilities Created Equal?

Identification Number:

doi:10.7910/DVN/NMWITM

Authoring Entity:

Yuval Feldman (Bar-Ilan University)

Doron Teichman (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

Distributor:

Harvard Dataverse

Date of Deposit:

2009-02-24

Holdings Information:

https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/NMWITM

Study Scope

Abstract:

<p>At the core of the economic analysis of law lies the concept of expected sanctions, which are calculated by multiplying the sanction that is applied to wrongdoers by the probability that it will be applied. This probability is a result of several sequential probabilities that involve the different actors responsible for sanctioning wrongdoers (e.g. police, prosecutors, judges, jurors, etc.). Generally, legal economists treat different legal probabilities as fungible and simply multiply them m uch like any other sequential probabilistic situation. In this paper we challenge this assumption, and demonstrate that different types of legal probabilities are perceived by people as different and are expected to affect their behavior in distinct ways. More specifically, we show that uncertainty associated with legal ambiguity and uncertainty associated with imperfect enforcement should not be treated as equal. </p> <br /> <p>To test these predictions, we designed a series of between-subjects experimental surveys that measured and compared participants’ attitudes toward compliance in conditions of uncertainty. We used a sample of several hundred students both from Israel and the United States who received a description of a hypothetical scenario in which the dimension that was manipulated was related to whether the source of uncertainty was in the legality of the behavior or in the likelihood of enforc ement (while holding the expected sanction constant). Overall these studies confirmed our main hypothesis that people will comply less, when the source of uncertainty is in the law itself, in comparison to situations where the source of uncertainty is in enforcement but the illegality is clear. </p>

Kind of Data:

Experimental Data

Methodology and Processing

Sources Statement

Data Access

Notes:

<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0">CC0 1.0</a>

Other Study Description Materials

Related Publications

Citation

Title:

84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. (forthcoming Oct. 2009).

Bibliographic Citation:

84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. (forthcoming Oct. 2009).

File Description--f1416460

File: study1.tab

  • Number of cases: 71

  • No. of variables per record: 8

  • Type of File: text/tab-separated-values

Notes:

UNF:3:WURVsmdcIq+lHJtj2lN9VQ==

File Description--f1416459

File: study2.tab

  • Number of cases: 159

  • No. of variables per record: 13

  • Type of File: text/tab-separated-values

Notes:

UNF:3:Qm6bWOvGqVsjSh6J5FHQ2A==

File Description--f1416458

File: study3.tab

  • Number of cases: 197

  • No. of variables per record: 13

  • Type of File: text/tab-separated-values

Notes:

UNF:3:g0o8yQwJoUbi4Xnhy9mGQg==

Variable Description

List of Variables:

  • uncertai - Type of Uncertainty
  • moral - Perceived Morality
  • socialy - Perceived Social Desirability
  • percent - Industry-wide Incompliance
  • statemen - Managerial Incompliance
  • possible - Attempt to Comply
  • money - Willingness to Pay
  • end - Intention to Violate the Law
  • sanction - Type of Sanction
  • ambiguou - Type of Uncertainty
  • version - Version of Study (Sanction x Uncertainty)
  • moral - Perceived Morality
  • undesira - Perceived Social Desirability
  • percent - Industry-wide Incompliance
  • statemen - Managerial Incompliance
  • trying - Attempt to Comply
  • money - Willingness to Pay
  • end - Intention to Violate the Law
  • gender - Gender
  • religion - Religion
  • filter__ - sanction =1 (FILTER)
  • uncertai - Type of Uncertainty
  • damage - Environmental Context
  • version - Version of Study (Environmental Context x Uncertainty)
  • moral - Perceived Morality
  • undesira - Perceived Social Desirability
  • percent - Industry-wide Incompliance
  • agree - Managerial Incompliance
  • trying - Attempt to Comply
  • money - Willingness to Pay
  • end - Intention to Violate the Law
  • gender - Gender
  • religion - Religion
  • filter__ - damage=2 (FILTER)

Variables

Type of Uncertainty

f1416460 Location:

Value

Label

Frequency

Text

2.

enforcement uncertainty

43

1.

legal uncertainty

28

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:aosNdSUSgPVh2I1Ewf65wQ==

Perceived Morality

f1416460 Location:

Value

Label

Frequency

Text

1.

1-acceptable

5

10.

10-unacceptable

19

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:t23LvPJRIiglazCAq3NFAw==

Perceived Social Desirability

f1416460 Location:

Value

Label

Frequency

Text

1.

1-acceptable

4

10.

10-unacceptable

11

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:yKRKYTXR9/+BQEXyMbz0xA==

Industry-wide Incompliance

f1416460 Location:

Value

Label

Frequency

Text

100.

100%

3

30.

30%

1

20.

20%

2

90.

90%

17

60.

60%

10

50.

50%

9

10.

10%

5

70.

70%

11

80.

80%

10

40.

40%

3

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:Qm291yEwBDtDVCAZiNXvbQ==

Managerial Incompliance

f1416460 Location:

Value

Label

Frequency

Text

10.

10-disagree

0

1.

1-agree

5

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:KGjyeXyrbetGRr8HTt6Htg==

Attempt to Comply

f1416460 Location:

Value

Label

Frequency

Text

1.

1-disagree

2

10.

10-agree

24

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:OkXtShd7ciFieCquIf9w2A==

Willingness to Pay

f1416460 Location:

Value

Label

Frequency

Text

10.

10-unacceptable

14

1.

1-acceptable

5

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:80FESxoCd3lV9sECpxsXsg==

Intention to Violate the Law

f1416460 Location:

Value

Label

Frequency

Text

1.

yes

19

2.

no

50

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:lBWdY+KZqOqmYUwwLxWEZw==

Type of Sanction

f1416459 Location:

Value

Label

Frequency

Text

2.

criminal law

77

1.

civil law

82

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:PWKkOdU4FhXnOCl2ZRDxww==

Type of Uncertainty

f1416459 Location:

Value

Label

Frequency

Text

1.

legal uncertainty

82

2.

enforcement uncertainty

77

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:3CA0AfMJz5DuCXQmvTAzEQ==

Version of Study (Sanction x Uncertainty)

f1416459 Location:

Value

Label

Frequency

Text

1.

civil law x legal uncertainty

40

4.

criminal law x enforcement uncertainty

35

2.

civil law x enforcement uncertainty

42

3.

civil law x legal uncertainty

42

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:zrLqMAWuHTfPqXsY+X60Rw==

Perceived Morality

f1416459 Location:

Value

Label

Frequency

Text

1.

1-acceptable

1

10.

10-unacceptable

53

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:nAQvpC+wd22ZzaUOwazDPA==

Perceived Social Desirability

f1416459 Location:

Value

Label

Frequency

Text

1.

1-acceptable

3

10.

10-unacceptable

45

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:57N90VdhNu51ZJblERh0Ng==

Industry-wide Incompliance

f1416459 Location:

Value

Label

Frequency

Text

60.

60%

18

70.

70%

27

50.

50%

14

10.

10%

0

90.

90%

44

30.

30%

1

80.

80%

32

100.

100%

18

20.

20%

0

40.

40%

5

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:aZR93Mul22eNooVxnj3avw==

Managerial Incompliance

f1416459 Location:

Value

Label

Frequency

Text

1.

1-agree

10.

10-disagree

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:jmn5oQPtBPKwUg1DbkrzjQ==

Attempt to Comply

f1416459 Location:

Value

Label

Frequency

Text

10.

10-agree

1.

1-disagree

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:3+83G9ykMh+HZGJosHy2aw==

Willingness to Pay

f1416459 Location:

Value

Label

Frequency

Text

10.

10-unacceptable

1.

1-acceptable

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:Vjnv2Y4woixR3cCGZGw7aw==

Intention to Violate the Law

f1416459 Location:

Value

Label

Frequency

Text

1.

yes

43

2.

no

116

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:y8pVYqAFk7h3ygMKsTzgog==

Gender

f1416459 Location:

Value

Label

Frequency

Text

1.

male

47

2.

female

111

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:zgpMYcjJvkHp2tzp8N0IKw==

Religion

f1416459 Location:

Value

Label

Frequency

Text

1.

religious

54

2.

masorati

16

3.

secular

81

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:Q5D2K43C1iMzBLVCQj9IVw==

sanction =1 (FILTER)

f1416459 Location:

Value

Label

Frequency

Text

0.

Not Selected

77

1.

Selected

82

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:bYJ1ExGcGVk97ebYhvSJ5g==

Type of Uncertainty

f1416458 Location:

Value

Label

Frequency

Text

1.

legal uncertainty

100

2.

enforcement uncertainty

97

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:Ka3g59N9+twY3HxYVRvTFQ==

Environmental Context

f1416458 Location:

Value

Label

Frequency

Text

2.

environmental damage

100

1.

no environmental damage

97

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:02jkw12SoVpr/SjveKPhkA==

Version of Study (Environmental Context x Uncertainty)

f1416458 Location:

Value

Label

Frequency

Text

4.

criminal law x enforcement uncertainty

50

1.

civil law x legal uncertainty

50

2.

civil law x enforcement uncertainty

50

3.

civil law x legal uncertainty

47

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:Cah7Whnwnb0ftYCUiHHZLg==

Perceived Morality

f1416458 Location:

Value

Label

Frequency

Text

1.

1-acceptable

10.

10-unacceptable

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:o9uLVVUsDRf//X8ftExZQw==

Perceived Social Desirability

f1416458 Location:

Value

Label

Frequency

Text

1.

1-acceptable

4

10.

10-unacceptable

41

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:QRn44wntUCPISr8pT5C8Qg==

Industry-wide Incompliance

f1416458 Location:

Value

Label

Frequency

Text

50.

50%

8

10.

10%

2

90.

90%

59

30.

30%

10

60.

60%

17

80.

80%

42

40.

40%

5

70.

70%

32

20.

20%

1

100.

100%

18

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:oJC5UbZ9WGZFP2y+eiMXiw==

Managerial Incompliance

f1416458 Location:

Value

Label

Frequency

Text

1.

1-agree

45

10.

10-disagree

4

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:Z1dUJnrwp6ENvXe2MrOPyA==

Attempt to Comply

f1416458 Location:

Value

Label

Frequency

Text

1.

1-disagree

4

10.

10-agree

44

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:c+a3uf9+7adUTPamhjEGEA==

Willingness to Pay

f1416458 Location:

Value

Label

Frequency

Text

1.

1-acceptable

17

10.

10-unacceptable

27

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:bJoru+AueQyJNkkrGtL+Sw==

Intention to Violate the Law

f1416458 Location:

Value

Label

Frequency

Text

2.

no

128

1.

yes

66

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:SzEFaMI2p5qX6efKNikoLg==

Gender

f1416458 Location:

Value

Label

Frequency

Text

2.

female

83

1.

male

110

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:mBTShpx3A76oGnBCO9wBmw==

Religion

f1416458 Location:

Value

Label

Frequency

Text

2.

masoraty

18

3.

secular

161

1.

religious

11

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:yYRG2EH2lxitxYlNT1WBpA==

damage=2 (FILTER)

f1416458 Location:

Value

Label

Frequency

Text

0.

Not Selected

97

1.

Selected

100

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:ENzj2/03jzJgMXe6TpGXvw==

Other Study-Related Materials

Label:

Codebook - Study 1.pdf

Text:

Notes:

application/pdf

Other Study-Related Materials

Label:

Codebook - Study 2.pdf

Text:

Notes:

application/pdf

Other Study-Related Materials

Label:

Codebook - Study 3.pdf

Text:

Notes:

application/pdf