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Part 1: Document Description
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Citation |
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Title: |
Replication Data for: Soldiers and Protest: A Set-Theory Perspective on Military Repression of Anti-Regime Mass Mobilization in Autocracies |
Identification Number: |
doi:10.7910/DVN/QVBVKC |
Distributor: |
Harvard Dataverse |
Date of Distribution: |
2023-05-24 |
Version: |
1 |
Bibliographic Citation: |
Interactions, International, 2023, "Replication Data for: Soldiers and Protest: A Set-Theory Perspective on Military Repression of Anti-Regime Mass Mobilization in Autocracies", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/QVBVKC, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:6:5ONeav84Y0Bzz+lD/XxDJQ== [fileUNF] |
Citation |
|
Title: |
Replication Data for: Soldiers and Protest: A Set-Theory Perspective on Military Repression of Anti-Regime Mass Mobilization in Autocracies |
Identification Number: |
doi:10.7910/DVN/QVBVKC |
Authoring Entity: |
Interactions, International (University of Pittsburgh) |
Distributor: |
Harvard Dataverse |
Access Authority: |
Interactions, International |
Depositor: |
Interactions, International |
Date of Deposit: |
2023-05-08 |
Holdings Information: |
https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/QVBVKC |
Study Scope |
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Keywords: |
Social Sciences, civil-military relations, mass protest, autocracy, military repression |
Abstract: |
What explains when militant groups claim attacks? In this study, I argue that militant groups are more likely to claim attacks early in the organization’s lifespan and after major blows to reputation like loss of a leader due to leadership decapitation. This is because credit-claiming helps militants signal resolve to a wider audience, thereby burnishing the organization’s reputation. Specifically, I argue that claims of militant attacks are costly for organizations because they may be met with government retaliation. However, groups that are younger or have recently suffered the loss of a leader seek to use government retaliation to signal resolve. I find support for this proposition using two sets of empirical analyses. First, I show that claims increase the risk of government retaliation. Then, using a comprehensive dataset of 592 groups, I show that militant groups are more likely to claim attacks in the earliest phases of their lifespans and after their leaders are killed/captured. Although civilian victimization and emerging due to splintering are found to be depressing credit claiming, the findings also suggest that (i) groups that only target security forces, (ii) groups that victimize civilians, (iii) groups that emerged independently without known affiliations with existing groups, and (iv) splinter groups all issue fewer claims as they age. These findings help elucidate a largely overlooked dimension of strategic militant behavior. |
Methodology and Processing |
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Sources Statement |
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Data Access |
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Other Study Description Materials |
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File Description--f7094829 |
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File: soldiers and protest_replication.tab |
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Notes: |
UNF:6:5ONeav84Y0Bzz+lD/XxDJQ== |
List of Variables: | |
Variables |
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f7094829 Location: |
Variable Format: character Notes: UNF:6:eEOuxeA9AmMTtxdNCVH3Jg== |
f7094829 Location: |
Summary Statistics: Valid 24.0; Mean 0.45833333333333337; StDev 0.5089773777040516; Max. 1.0; Min. 0.0 Variable Format: numeric Notes: UNF:6:JPgB8yGEqV4K1vAbSXpB3A== |
f7094829 Location: |
Summary Statistics: Max. 1.0; Valid 24.0; StDev 0.49453535504684026; Mean 0.625; Min. 0.0 Variable Format: numeric Notes: UNF:6:+4i949QBBuri3FS3FftflA== |
f7094829 Location: |
Summary Statistics: StDev 0.5107539184552492; Min. 0.0; Max. 1.0; Valid 24.0; Mean 0.5 Variable Format: numeric Notes: UNF:6:XsoBVd4N7nP78umgA2qhZQ== |
f7094829 Location: |
Summary Statistics: Mean 0.5416666666666666; Min. 0.0; Max. 1.0; Valid 24.0; StDev 0.5089773777040516 Variable Format: numeric Notes: UNF:6:VgxPg2DYAwmsl9tqNVYckA== |
f7094829 Location: |
Summary Statistics: Min. 0.0; Valid 24.0; Mean 0.6666666666666667; StDev 0.48154341234307674; Max. 1.0 Variable Format: numeric Notes: UNF:6:eKJNkPqxRuXoxoqgz0aLYA== |
f7094829 Location: |
Summary Statistics: Min. 0.0; Valid 24.0; Max. 1.0; Mean 0.5416666666666666; StDev 0.5089773777040516 Variable Format: numeric Notes: UNF:6:B/GZyrtcfQChAEXHVn6KuQ== |
f7094829 Location: |
Summary Statistics: Max. 1.0; Valid 24.0; Mean 0.29166666666666663; StDev 0.4643056214875365; Min. 0.0; Variable Format: numeric Notes: UNF:6:VkBaWX/nX91OkIKDcZy2/g== |
Label: |
R code_soldiers and protest.R |
Notes: |
type/x-r-syntax |