Replication Data for: Soldiers and Protest: A Set-Theory Perspective on Military Repression of Anti-Regime Mass Mobilization in Autocracies (doi:10.7910/DVN/QVBVKC)

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Part 1: Document Description
Part 2: Study Description
Part 3: Data Files Description
Part 4: Variable Description
Part 5: Other Study-Related Materials
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Document Description

Citation

Title:

Replication Data for: Soldiers and Protest: A Set-Theory Perspective on Military Repression of Anti-Regime Mass Mobilization in Autocracies

Identification Number:

doi:10.7910/DVN/QVBVKC

Distributor:

Harvard Dataverse

Date of Distribution:

2023-05-24

Version:

1

Bibliographic Citation:

Interactions, International, 2023, "Replication Data for: Soldiers and Protest: A Set-Theory Perspective on Military Repression of Anti-Regime Mass Mobilization in Autocracies", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/QVBVKC, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:6:5ONeav84Y0Bzz+lD/XxDJQ== [fileUNF]

Study Description

Citation

Title:

Replication Data for: Soldiers and Protest: A Set-Theory Perspective on Military Repression of Anti-Regime Mass Mobilization in Autocracies

Identification Number:

doi:10.7910/DVN/QVBVKC

Authoring Entity:

Interactions, International (University of Pittsburgh)

Distributor:

Harvard Dataverse

Access Authority:

Interactions, International

Depositor:

Interactions, International

Date of Deposit:

2023-05-08

Holdings Information:

https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/QVBVKC

Study Scope

Keywords:

Social Sciences, civil-military relations, mass protest, autocracy, military repression

Abstract:

What explains when militant groups claim attacks? In this study, I argue that militant groups are more likely to claim attacks early in the organization’s lifespan and after major blows to reputation like loss of a leader due to leadership decapitation. This is because credit-claiming helps militants signal resolve to a wider audience, thereby burnishing the organization’s reputation. Specifically, I argue that claims of militant attacks are costly for organizations because they may be met with government retaliation. However, groups that are younger or have recently suffered the loss of a leader seek to use government retaliation to signal resolve. I find support for this proposition using two sets of empirical analyses. First, I show that claims increase the risk of government retaliation. Then, using a comprehensive dataset of 592 groups, I show that militant groups are more likely to claim attacks in the earliest phases of their lifespans and after their leaders are killed/captured. Although civilian victimization and emerging due to splintering are found to be depressing credit claiming, the findings also suggest that (i) groups that only target security forces, (ii) groups that victimize civilians, (iii) groups that emerged independently without known affiliations with existing groups, and (iv) splinter groups all issue fewer claims as they age. These findings help elucidate a largely overlooked dimension of strategic militant behavior.

Methodology and Processing

Sources Statement

Data Access

Other Study Description Materials

File Description--f7094829

File: soldiers and protest_replication.tab

  • Number of cases: 24

  • No. of variables per record: 8

  • Type of File: text/tab-separated-values

Notes:

UNF:6:5ONeav84Y0Bzz+lD/XxDJQ==

Variable Description

List of Variables:

Variables

case

f7094829 Location:

Variable Format: character

Notes: UNF:6:eEOuxeA9AmMTtxdNCVH3Jg==

repression

f7094829 Location:

Summary Statistics: Valid 24.0; Mean 0.45833333333333337; StDev 0.5089773777040516; Max. 1.0; Min. 0.0

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:JPgB8yGEqV4K1vAbSXpB3A==

s

f7094829 Location:

Summary Statistics: Max. 1.0; Valid 24.0; StDev 0.49453535504684026; Mean 0.625; Min. 0.0

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:+4i949QBBuri3FS3FftflA==

p

f7094829 Location:

Summary Statistics: StDev 0.5107539184552492; Min. 0.0; Max. 1.0; Valid 24.0; Mean 0.5

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:XsoBVd4N7nP78umgA2qhZQ==

u

f7094829 Location:

Summary Statistics: Mean 0.5416666666666666; Min. 0.0; Max. 1.0; Valid 24.0; StDev 0.5089773777040516

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:VgxPg2DYAwmsl9tqNVYckA==

c

f7094829 Location:

Summary Statistics: Min. 0.0; Valid 24.0; Mean 0.6666666666666667; StDev 0.48154341234307674; Max. 1.0

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:eKJNkPqxRuXoxoqgz0aLYA==

v

f7094829 Location:

Summary Statistics: Min. 0.0; Valid 24.0; Max. 1.0; Mean 0.5416666666666666; StDev 0.5089773777040516

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:B/GZyrtcfQChAEXHVn6KuQ==

pers

f7094829 Location:

Summary Statistics: Max. 1.0; Valid 24.0; Mean 0.29166666666666663; StDev 0.4643056214875365; Min. 0.0;

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:VkBaWX/nX91OkIKDcZy2/g==

Other Study-Related Materials

Label:

R code_soldiers and protest.R

Notes:

type/x-r-syntax