Replication data for: Political Institutions, Coercive Diplomacy, and the Duration of Economic Sanctions (doi:10.7910/DVN/RB1USI)

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Part 1: Document Description
Part 2: Study Description
Part 3: Data Files Description
Part 4: Variable Description
Part 5: Other Study-Related Materials
Entire Codebook

Document Description

Citation

Title:

Replication data for: Political Institutions, Coercive Diplomacy, and the Duration of Economic Sanctions

Identification Number:

doi:10.7910/DVN/RB1USI

Distributor:

Harvard Dataverse

Date of Distribution:

2007-11-28

Version:

1

Bibliographic Citation:

Fiona McGillivray; Allan C. Stam III, 2007, "Replication data for: Political Institutions, Coercive Diplomacy, and the Duration of Economic Sanctions", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/RB1USI, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:3:UTImW6pM1r+f13kfNEYJrQ== [fileUNF]

Study Description

Citation

Title:

Replication data for: Political Institutions, Coercive Diplomacy, and the Duration of Economic Sanctions

Identification Number:

doi:10.7910/DVN/RB1USI

Authoring Entity:

Fiona McGillivray (New York University)

Allan C. Stam III (University of Michigan)

Date of Production:

2004

Distributor:

Harvard Dataverse

Distributor:

Allan C. Stam

Date of Deposit:

2007-07

Date of Distribution:

2007

Holdings Information:

https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/RB1USI

Study Scope

Keywords:

coercive diplomacy, democratic leadership, nondemocratic leadership, economic sanctions, sender state, target state, policy change

Abstract:

A theory of sanction duration that focuses on differences between democratic and nondemocratic states in the structure of leaders’ support coalitions is tested, using a hazard model to analyze a data set of 47 sanction events with 272 observations. Results show that leadership change strongly affects the duration of sanctions only in the case of nondemocratic states. Leadership change in democratic states is unrelated to the duration of sanctions; however, leadership change in nondemocratic sender and nondemocratic target states is strongly related to the ending of economic sanctions.

Methodology and Processing

Sources Statement

Data Access

Notes:

<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0">CC0 1.0</a>

Other Study Description Materials

Related Publications

Citation

Title:

McGillivray, Fiona; Stam III, Allan C. (2004) "Political Institutions, Coercive Diplomacy, and the Duration of Economic Sanctions"Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 48, No. 2, 154-172, doi:10.1177/0022002703262858: <a href= "http://jcr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/48/2/154"> article available here </a>

Bibliographic Citation:

McGillivray, Fiona; Stam III, Allan C. (2004) "Political Institutions, Coercive Diplomacy, and the Duration of Economic Sanctions"Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 48, No. 2, 154-172, doi:10.1177/0022002703262858: <a href= "http://jcr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/48/2/154"> article available here </a>

File Description--f110285

File: Sanctionsreplicate.tab

  • Number of cases: 361

  • No. of variables per record: 26

  • Type of File: text/tab-separated-values

Notes:

UNF:3:UTImW6pM1r+f13kfNEYJrQ==

Data file

Variable Description

List of Variables:

Variables

Observation

f110285 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:TDHtGUgZAyfqiKbrDC8oLw==

Case #

f110285 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:HCSV2pWwmVO1YuDxlLRfgQ==

Case Name

f110285 Location:

Variable Format: character

Notes: UNF:3:Ryn3iilJaZcy0AAuCb4UEg==

Time

f110285 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:IFe31Ac2S51GHZIjYm6jKQ==

CCode1

f110285 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:kqbd7PBjrgWPeh0jUe5UMA==

CCode2

f110285 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:BOmQ9e2zDJ0ZVtFmu6FZng==

Year

f110285 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:ZIn0Ei1LaF9nTUoT1T1+Rw==

DyadDur

f110285 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:vuzmhTkSjInwbXUb3109xA==

Died

f110285 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:8sl0KuoLzvyrGy2cyhakjQ==

failtime

f110285 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:70BZnRanrkFlmu075yTbkA==

dist

f110285 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:QrGs3t90T5w+mtFFq8BRFw==

Maj1-Maj2

f110285 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:a8LwjIMCZHabs3l43yw44A==

dem1-aut1

f110285 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:yyohPjAJaxDxZ3yRxFtmEg==

1 if dem1=10

f110285 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:WZaCvJmkvEr4SFkb0CDBdA==

1 if politics<=-7

f110285 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:Oax7sgakkERbF1IHaG5Qtg==

entry time

f110285 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:mqTUruiCXR9JYPcBvjltIA==

US

f110285 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:cLOFJIUXRS2ZE2JPFDQTWw==

Tau b global mean substitution

f110285 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:+sD9Nh2jih09GCHlDxqbKw==

Success > 12

f110285 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:Q/wcEtgXCYe3ucEnUw5ejg==

Democ =10, no US

f110285 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:WqafVF82+hR+A/iqKnyrIg==

oligarch

f110285 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:rEc45ulwOVcpb/YHgF6CIg==

_t

f110285 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:70BZnRanrkFlmu075yTbkA==

_t0

f110285 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:mqTUruiCXR9JYPcBvjltIA==

_d

f110285 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:8sl0KuoLzvyrGy2cyhakjQ==

_st

f110285 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:Ho+tj3vghxS2L6VZFlBNMA==

USsave

f110285 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:cLOFJIUXRS2ZE2JPFDQTWw==

Other Study-Related Materials

Label:

sanctionsreplicate.zip

Text:

Zip file containing original Stata data file for this study

Notes:

application/x-zip-compressed