Replication data for: Trading for Security: Military Alliances and Economic Agreements (doi:10.7910/DVN/RVPB3X)

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Part 1: Document Description
Part 2: Study Description
Part 3: Data Files Description
Part 4: Variable Description
Part 5: Other Study-Related Materials
Entire Codebook

Document Description

Citation

Title:

Replication data for: Trading for Security: Military Alliances and Economic Agreements

Identification Number:

doi:10.7910/DVN/RVPB3X

Distributor:

Harvard Dataverse

Date of Distribution:

2007-11-28

Version:

1

Bibliographic Citation:

Brett Ashley Leeds; Andrew G. Long, 2007, "Replication data for: Trading for Security: Military Alliances and Economic Agreements", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/RVPB3X, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:3:BkmgogT1bo1czLyzc9dk4g== [fileUNF]

Study Description

Citation

Title:

Replication data for: Trading for Security: Military Alliances and Economic Agreements

Identification Number:

doi:10.7910/DVN/RVPB3X

Authoring Entity:

Brett Ashley Leeds (Rice University)

Andrew G. Long (University of Mississippi)

Date of Production:

2006

Distributor:

Harvard Dataverse

Distributor:

Brett Ashley Leeds

Date of Deposit:

2007-07-09

Date of Distribution:

2007

Holdings Information:

https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/RVPB3X

Study Scope

Abstract:

The authors appraise a well-known argument connecting economics and security in international relations; military allies are likely to trade more with one another than non-allies. A review of alliance treaties and diplomatic history suggests that under certain conditions states may tie together alliance agreements and economic agreements. When states explicitly link alliance agreements with economic cooperation, one would expect to see increased economic exchange coinciding with coordinated security policies. This study evaluates whether the linking of economic and security agreements accounts for a positive relationship between alliances and trade among European states before WWII, and produces evidence in support of this argument. Trade among allies who have specified economic cooperation in their alliance agreements is higher than trade among non-allied states and higher than trade among allies who have not promised economic cooperation. In contrast, trade among allies without specific economic provisions in their treaties is statistically no different from trade among non-allies. Thus, the positive empirical relationship between alliances and trade that the authors find in Pre-WWII Europe is a result of only a specific subset of all military alliances, namely those treaties that stipulate economic cooperation between the allies. This study advances our understanding of the alliance-trade relationship by focusing attention on the joint negotiation of cooperation in different issue areas.

Methodology and Processing

Sources Statement

Data Access

Notes:

<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0">CC0 1.0</a>

Other Study Description Materials

Related Publications

Citation

Title:

Andrew G.Long, Brett Ashley Leeds. 2006. "Trading for Security: Military Alliances and Economic Agreements." Journal of Peace Research 43 (4): 433-451. <a href="http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~leeds/LongLeedsJPR.pdf" target= "_new"> article available here </a>

Bibliographic Citation:

Andrew G.Long, Brett Ashley Leeds. 2006. "Trading for Security: Military Alliances and Economic Agreements." Journal of Peace Research 43 (4): 433-451. <a href="http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~leeds/LongLeedsJPR.pdf" target= "_new"> article available here </a>

File Description--f112040

File: Trading for Security Ancillary Results.tab

  • Number of cases: 10707

  • No. of variables per record: 20

  • Type of File: text/tab-separated-values

Notes:

UNF:3:zoUdk5nQmSm01PA12m/yMw==

State SE 8.2 data file for this study

File Description--f112039

File: Trading for Security Table I.tab

  • Number of cases: 10707

  • No. of variables per record: 15

  • Type of File: text/tab-separated-values

Notes:

UNF:3:8kj5peZzbaqyS2kmzolFow==

State SE 8.2 data file for this study

Variable Description

List of Variables:
  • dyad
  • year
  • trade - ln of dyadic trade(Barbieri and Russett and Oneal data)
  • ROtrade - ln of dyadic trade(Russett and Oneal data only)
  • Similarity - ln of Global Similarity Score
  • Tau_b - ln of Global Kendall's Taub of Alliance Portfolios
  • JointDemocracy - =1 if both countries score 6 or higher on Polity 3 democracy scale
  • MIDlag - =1 if dyad fights a MID during year t-1
  • allies - =1 if countries are allies
  • Lallies - =1 if countries are linked allies
  • NLallies - =1 if countries are non-linked allies
  • GDP_1_real - ln of GDP country 1, no imputed values
  • GDP_2_real - ln of GDP country 2, no imputed values
  • GDP_1 - ln of GDP country 1, with imputed values
  • GDP_2 - ln of GDP country 2, with imputed values
  • POP_1 - ln of population for country 1
  • POP_2 - ln of population for country 2
  • Distance - ln of capital to capital distance
  • Border - =1 if states are contiguous by land or less than 200 miles of water
  • Hegemony - =1 for years prior to 1914
  • dyad
  • year
  • trade - ln of dyadic trade(Barbieri and Russett and Oneal data)
  • GDP_1 - ln of GDP country 1, with imputed values
  • GDP_2 - ln of GDP country 2, with imputed values
  • POP_1 - ln of population for country 1
  • POP_2 - ln of population for country 2
  • Distance - ln of capital to capital distance
  • Border - =1 if states are contiguous by land or less than 200 miles of water
  • Hegemony - =1 for years prior to 1914
  • Similarity - ln of Global Similarity Score
  • JointDemocracy - =1 if both countries score 6 or higher on Polity 3 democracy scale
  • MIDlag - =1 if dyad fights a MID during year t-1
  • Lallies - =1 if countries are linked allies
  • NLallies - =1 if countries are non-linked allies

Variables

dyad

f112040 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:TC7N4DylRB8cp5N6TcqZiQ==

year

f112040 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:o/Jzj6afcyLM0mm0KAQ+RQ==

ln of dyadic trade(Barbieri and Russett and Oneal data)

f112040 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:zzudYnxEoWR3Fp4IW/k9Ig==

ln of dyadic trade(Russett and Oneal data only)

f112040 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:BKC9k2RsUdne5hDzNmze+A==

ln of Global Similarity Score

f112040 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:oeYJziQOCL/fQ70CKNNUyQ==

ln of Global Kendall's Taub of Alliance Portfolios

f112040 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:BURj0/idS5IuIzPtqlsnKA==

=1 if both countries score 6 or higher on Polity 3 democracy scale

f112040 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:rA1cSkJ/6Wqfh+jMhoAinQ==

=1 if dyad fights a MID during year t-1

f112040 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:5Kc5C5lBQMePNHeZE71YzQ==

=1 if countries are allies

f112040 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:iuRFBqkA+oyoNx+bvWYGPA==

=1 if countries are linked allies

f112040 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:++ukmgG3TTtA5YGyzD2FfA==

=1 if countries are non-linked allies

f112040 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:N59m4E3c1/I4320rWYoxXA==

ln of GDP country 1, no imputed values

f112040 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:lTDpuYsVQxED1vIeOhGLHQ==

ln of GDP country 2, no imputed values

f112040 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:X7cwx6/yMl340M/NUnaX+w==

ln of GDP country 1, with imputed values

f112040 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:E4TgrZwLDu9DuH5hV+RaFw==

ln of GDP country 2, with imputed values

f112040 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:Jy1VvvVoW4RvM23VX82kSA==

ln of population for country 1

f112040 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:1YzIrSgvSBOcHekBcwv86w==

ln of population for country 2

f112040 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:yTNVPOWw9GBSZ5jwTGez0w==

ln of capital to capital distance

f112040 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:KDUGlW8Jd2Y1bVHvR+VNCQ==

=1 if states are contiguous by land or less than 200 miles of water

f112040 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:mIv5k8KigUzVHinZwbjrDw==

=1 for years prior to 1914

f112040 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:TXDEBHX7YQFMXuVsLnfUOQ==

dyad

f112039 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:TC7N4DylRB8cp5N6TcqZiQ==

year

f112039 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:o/Jzj6afcyLM0mm0KAQ+RQ==

ln of dyadic trade(Barbieri and Russett and Oneal data)

f112039 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:zzudYnxEoWR3Fp4IW/k9Ig==

ln of GDP country 1, with imputed values

f112039 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:E4TgrZwLDu9DuH5hV+RaFw==

ln of GDP country 2, with imputed values

f112039 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:Jy1VvvVoW4RvM23VX82kSA==

ln of population for country 1

f112039 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:1YzIrSgvSBOcHekBcwv86w==

ln of population for country 2

f112039 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:yTNVPOWw9GBSZ5jwTGez0w==

ln of capital to capital distance

f112039 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:KDUGlW8Jd2Y1bVHvR+VNCQ==

=1 if states are contiguous by land or less than 200 miles of water

f112039 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:mIv5k8KigUzVHinZwbjrDw==

=1 for years prior to 1914

f112039 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:TXDEBHX7YQFMXuVsLnfUOQ==

ln of Global Similarity Score

f112039 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:oeYJziQOCL/fQ70CKNNUyQ==

=1 if both countries score 6 or higher on Polity 3 democracy scale

f112039 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:rA1cSkJ/6Wqfh+jMhoAinQ==

=1 if dyad fights a MID during year t-1

f112039 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:5Kc5C5lBQMePNHeZE71YzQ==

=1 if countries are linked allies

f112039 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:++ukmgG3TTtA5YGyzD2FfA==

=1 if countries are non-linked allies

f112039 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:3:N59m4E3c1/I4320rWYoxXA==

Other Study-Related Materials

Label:

LongLeedsJPRreplication.zip

Text:

Zip file containing data for this study

Notes:

application/x-zip-compressed

Other Study-Related Materials

Label:

trading for security ancillary results.csv

Text:

Data file in csv format

Notes:

application/vnd.ms-excel

Other Study-Related Materials

Label:

Trading for Security Ancillary Results.do

Text:

All ancillary results reported by the authors

Notes:

text/plain; charset=US-ASCII

Other Study-Related Materials

Label:

trading for security table i.csv

Text:

Data file in csv format

Notes:

application/vnd.ms-excel

Other Study-Related Materials

Label:

Trading for Security Table I.do

Text:

Containing the code that generates the results reported in Table I of the article

Notes:

text/plain; charset=US-ASCII

Other Study-Related Materials

Label:

TradingforSecurityreadme.txt

Text:

Readme text file for this study

Notes:

text/plain