Replication Data for: Security-Civil Liberties Trade-offs: International Cooperation in Extraordinary Rendition (doi:10.7910/DVN/VB6GAD)

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Part 1: Document Description
Part 2: Study Description
Part 3: Data Files Description
Part 4: Variable Description
Part 5: Other Study-Related Materials
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Document Description

Citation

Title:

Replication Data for: Security-Civil Liberties Trade-offs: International Cooperation in Extraordinary Rendition

Identification Number:

doi:10.7910/DVN/VB6GAD

Distributor:

Harvard Dataverse

Date of Distribution:

2018-10-08

Version:

1

Bibliographic Citation:

Cordell, Rebecca, 2018, "Replication Data for: Security-Civil Liberties Trade-offs: International Cooperation in Extraordinary Rendition", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/VB6GAD, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:6:SpBOhSCFBEw3+uCu6wMTeQ== [fileUNF]

Study Description

Citation

Title:

Replication Data for: Security-Civil Liberties Trade-offs: International Cooperation in Extraordinary Rendition

Identification Number:

doi:10.7910/DVN/VB6GAD

Authoring Entity:

Cordell, Rebecca (Arizona State University)

Distributor:

Harvard Dataverse

Access Authority:

Cordell, Rebecca

Depositor:

Cordell, Rebecca

Date of Deposit:

2018-10-08

Holdings Information:

https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/VB6GAD

Study Scope

Keywords:

Social Sciences

Abstract:

Following the launch of the WoT, the US established a global rendition network that saw the transfer of CIA terrorist suspects to secret detention sites across the world. Conventional accounts of foreign complicity show that 54 diverse countries were involved, including many established democracies. What determined more than a quarter of the world’s countries to participate in RDI operations during the post-9/11 period? Given the sensitive nature of cooperation required, I argue that the US screened countries according to their preferences on security-civil liberties trade-offs. Countries with similar preferences to the US on human rights were cheaper to buy off and would have required less persuasion to cooperate. This theory is consistent with the existing claim that cooperation is more likely between countries with similar preferences as both actors are better off when the partnership increases. I test this hypothesis on global data using UNGA voting data as a proxy for common interest and develop a spatial variable that models a country’s logistical utility during the transfer of a detainee based on their distance to a central rendition transit corridor between the US and Afghanistan. The analysis provides robust empirical support for my theoretical argument.

Methodology and Processing

Sources Statement

Data Access

Notes:

<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0">CC0 1.0</a>

Other Study Description Materials

Related Publications

Citation

Title:

Cordell, Rebecca. 2018. "Security-Civil Liberties Trade-offs: International Cooperation in Extraordinary Rendition" International Interactions. https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2019.1522307.

Bibliographic Citation:

Cordell, Rebecca. 2018. "Security-Civil Liberties Trade-offs: International Cooperation in Extraordinary Rendition" International Interactions. https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2019.1522307.

File Description--f3238487

File: Cordell-SecurityCivilLiberties-Data.tab

  • Number of cases: 169

  • No. of variables per record: 22

  • Type of File: text/tab-separated-values

Notes:

UNF:6:SpBOhSCFBEw3+uCu6wMTeQ==

Variable Description

List of Variables:

Variables

ccode

f3238487 Location:

Summary Statistics: Min. 20.0; StDev 238.37917474557406; Max. 950.0; Valid 169.0; Mean 463.1538461538462

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:z0cDiDvAlsb0vjrlUdgMug==

statenme

f3238487 Location:

Variable Format: character

Notes: UNF:6:hclBKdBxcz1ALHd+qVmUmA==

stateabb

f3238487 Location:

Variable Format: character

Notes: UNF:6:cvT34HHjHRPEW9Cbeyxm0A==

osf_coop

f3238487 Location:

Summary Statistics: StDev 0.46533844713930933; Mean 0.31360946745562124; Min. 0.0; Max. 1.0; Valid 169.0

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:sscmg4URYDlatTBm5W8tLQ==

hr_sim_9100

f3238487 Location:

Summary Statistics: Max. 2.193681783; Mean 1.2580810125928144; Valid 167.0; StDev 0.43984251913160016; Min. 0.089796956;

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:5BcIP3eU8bOZifWI7Nks3w==

all_sim_9100

f3238487 Location:

Summary Statistics: Valid 167.0; StDev 0.8346980901517018; Min. 0.5204325; Mean 2.9385267963173654; Max. 4.5179385

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:5e0+lFhNzkmhsZh4mzZtyw==

centrendcorr_log

f3238487 Location:

Summary Statistics: Max. 9.412385008; StDev 1.218201781972469; Valid 169.0; Min. 3.087926786; Mean 7.785118852443787;

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:OiPFCxM4Y6vCVgmVsF7HnA==

alliance

f3238487 Location:

Summary Statistics: Min. 0.0; StDev 0.457783873624542; Valid 169.0; Max. 1.0; Mean 0.29585798816568043

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:tY4LqOBzEAT/lfxZMi7yUw==

regime

f3238487 Location:

Summary Statistics: StDev 0.2747371673122051; Min. 0.029454005; Mean 0.5292281562278481; Valid 158.0; Max. 0.941023114

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:abTtQO3TkcKKDBRuzH66ww==

terr_9100_log

f3238487 Location:

Summary Statistics: Mean 1.990622752720238; Min. 0.0; StDev 1.464397994865415; Valid 168.0; Max. 6.398594935;

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:xIjLm8h3KT9KOv4Zvq1WDw==

ustrade_log

f3238487 Location:

Summary Statistics: Valid 169.0; Max. 13.7722332; StDev 2.903028409763048; Min. 0.0; Mean 8.221408749331362

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:E9HLrBKJTWH6xZhDLPhxZQ==

usaid_log

f3238487 Location:

Summary Statistics: Mean 5.307764453491124; Min. 0.0; Max. 11.12774686; Valid 169.0; StDev 3.135301492853829;

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:6RTzxoGJJFZkknmwLFz+yg==

pop_log

f3238487 Location:

Summary Statistics: StDev 1.6396697807749399; Valid 169.0; Min. 5.547440507; Max. 14.04304291; Mean 8.996850133621303;

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:Q8zRuAc3HWV4ppijDjq3pw==

partyideo

f3238487 Location:

Summary Statistics: Valid 169.0; Max. 1.0; Min. 0.0; StDev 0.4106568558473577; Mean 0.21301775147928978

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:liHdKXqZhw3DEqvBwNWX+Q==

treatment

f3238487 Location:

Summary Statistics: Max. 1.0; StDev 0.48931957173180535; Valid 169.0; Min. 0.0; Mean 0.39053254437869833

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:/BLYXcSCTO4daleV062YYg==

lat

f3238487 Location:

Summary Statistics: Valid 169.0; Mean 22.119264128011835; Max. 68.24330139; StDev 22.91782858936275; Min. -31.43849945;

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:zzlrNGpySoi+YMIoycpRtA==

long

f3238487 Location:

Summary Statistics: StDev 57.91079885179388; Max. 179.7401047; Mean 18.827106353639053; Min. -159.8059998; Valid 169.0

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:Oox7X+Qgp9dF9W33jq4iJw==

coop_host

f3238487 Location:

Summary Statistics: Valid 169.0; StDev 0.19985201625794766; Min. 0.0; Mean 0.04142011834319528; Max. 1.0

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:A5VywHwgtCMwisWPKf0Ycg==

coop_arrdetint

f3238487 Location:

Summary Statistics: Min. 0.0; StDev 0.40207618409836726; Mean 0.20118343195266272; Max. 1.0; Valid 169.0

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:pRB6voQzkIa/aRKauovZuw==

coop_intel

f3238487 Location:

Summary Statistics: Min. 0.0; StDev 0.1324392394856476; Valid 169.0; Mean 0.017751479289940825; Max. 1.0;

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:DpFzfhPbuBUBCmtsnGU5hw==

coop_air

f3238487 Location:

Summary Statistics: Min. 0.0; Mean 0.21893491124260356; Max. 1.0; StDev 0.41475328498386027; Valid 169.0;

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:5DB1sQNMFs1+CwxMYsgyNw==

ed_sim_9100

f3238487 Location:

Summary Statistics: Mean 2.717739453053892; StDev 0.2684750811268705; Max. 3.313836267; Valid 167.0; Min. 0.471297229

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:sVl1316s3h28BEdRzN9GCw==

Other Study-Related Materials

Label:

Cordell-SecurityCivilLiberties-Replication-File.R

Notes:

type/x-r-syntax