Replication Data for: Economic Sanctions, Transnational Terrorism, and the Incentive to Misrepresent (doi:10.7910/DVN/VNTVO6)

View:

Part 1: Document Description
Part 2: Study Description
Part 3: Data Files Description
Part 4: Variable Description
Part 5: Other Study-Related Materials
Entire Codebook

Document Description

Citation

Title:

Replication Data for: Economic Sanctions, Transnational Terrorism, and the Incentive to Misrepresent

Identification Number:

doi:10.7910/DVN/VNTVO6

Distributor:

Harvard Dataverse

Date of Distribution:

2015-07-17

Version:

1

Bibliographic Citation:

Bapat, Navin; De la Calle, Luis; Hinkkainen, Kaisa H.; McLean, Elena V., 2015, "Replication Data for: Economic Sanctions, Transnational Terrorism, and the Incentive to Misrepresent", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/VNTVO6, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:6:AGVBLBlHXLugPVkNO7lg/g== [fileUNF]

Study Description

Citation

Title:

Replication Data for: Economic Sanctions, Transnational Terrorism, and the Incentive to Misrepresent

Identification Number:

doi:10.7910/DVN/VNTVO6

Authoring Entity:

Bapat, Navin (UNC - Chapel Hill)

De la Calle, Luis (Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE) )

Hinkkainen, Kaisa H. (University of Lincoln)

McLean, Elena V. (SUNY Buffalo)

Distributor:

Harvard Dataverse

Distributor:

The Journal of Politics Dataverse

Access Authority:

Bapat, Navin

Depositor:

Bapat, Navin

Date of Deposit:

2015-07-16

Holdings Information:

https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/VNTVO6

Study Scope

Keywords:

Social Sciences, terrorism; economic sanctions, state sponsorship, bargaining

Abstract:

Can economic sanctions combat transnational terrorism effectively? Policymakers argue that sanctions can deter state sponsorship, but are counterproductive against hosts of transnational terrorists. However, recent cases indicate that governments are often uncertain if foreign states are truly sponsors versus hosts, and cannot perfectly determine the type of foreign support terrorists are receiving. We argue that this uncertainty, coupled with the proposed strategy of punishing sponsors while cooperating with hosts, creates incentives for sponsors to misrepresent themselves as host states while continuing their support for terrorists. Using a game theoretic model, we demonstrate that in this environment of uncertainty, governments rely on information regarding the state capacity of supporting states to deduce their relationship with terrorists. Consequently, governments are more likely to impose sanctions against foreign states with intermediate levels of state capacity, but are less likely to impose sanctions against failing or stronger states. Our empirical test using the Threat and Imposition of Sanctions (TIES) dataset and the Global Terrorism Data (GTD) provides robust support for this hypothesis.

Methodology and Processing

Sources Statement

Data Access

Notes:

<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0">CC0 1.0</a>

Other Study Description Materials

File Description--f2694275

File: replication_data.tab

  • Number of cases: 3725

  • No. of variables per record: 18

  • Type of File: text/tab-separated-values

Notes:

UNF:6:AGVBLBlHXLugPVkNO7lg/g==

Replication Data

Variable Description

List of Variables:

Variables

ccode

f2694275 Location:

Summary Statistics: Max. 1013.0; StDev 272.69870228585455; Min. 41.0; Mean 496.2869798657849; Valid 3725.0

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:GXdoFdujwatcE386DSjJOg==

year

f2694275 Location:

Summary Statistics: Valid 3725.0; Mean 1987.5006711409396; StDev 10.96593260294577; Max. 2006.0; Min. 1969.0;

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:Imt9N604mnABpq5CtqxYCA==

polity2

f2694275 Location:

Summary Statistics: Max. 10.0; StDev 7.070132668713343; Min. -10.0; Valid 3254.0; Mean -0.4431468961278188

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:jIIAGcZfbkLnRX2OqXkU6A==

S3UN (Voeten)

f2694275 Location:

Summary Statistics: Min. -1.0; Valid 3201.0; Mean -0.24040976414844986; Max. 1.0; StDev 0.32048036007626945;

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:V6Hqoo7qxjPfDCvmvburag==

=ln( GDPpc_constant )

f2694275 Location:

Summary Statistics: Mean 7.499105848644228; Valid 2983.0; Min. 3.9128668308258057; Max. 11.313831329345703; StDev 1.4301707225436668

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:XCz3LBOFW/1p1P0v2mkJng==

=GDPpc_constant/1000

f2694275 Location:

Summary Statistics: Mean 5.383910424310491; Max. 81.9472427368164; Valid 2983.0; Min. 0.050042204558849335; StDev 9.965588551538898

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:RRR3WK1a7V3yqhbscnYBKQ==

=ln(population)

f2694275 Location:

Summary Statistics: StDev 1.6230435460823387; Mean 15.93728140900606; Max. 20.857175827026367; Valid 3603.0; Min. 9.086023330688477;

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:a9pRkl3Qki+jqGrhdrkCCQ==

= ln(US_imports_GDP) (Barbieri & Keshk)

f2694275 Location:

Summary Statistics: Min. -32.87059783935547; Valid 3270.0; Max. -18.051231384277344; Mean -23.744889336332278; StDev 2.486932843541483;

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:yRAk61XqtucAGm0RetCf/A==

= ln(US_exports_GDP) (Barbieri & Keshk)

f2694275 Location:

Summary Statistics: Min. -32.582916259765625; Mean -23.69866039315918; StDev 2.1256255450159887; Max. -18.1107120513916; Valid 3355.0

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:75CK6aCEXB86oW1KmobzAw==

Transition to autocracy (Cheibub)

f2694275 Location:

Summary Statistics: Min. 0.0; Max. 1.0; StDev 0.09236509793024446; Valid 3371.0; Mean 0.00860278849006225

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:q3JRwyUGFugycdmHoDN9VQ==

=1 if intrastate war; =0 o/w (Sarkees and Wayman)

f2694275 Location:

Summary Statistics: Valid 3725.0; Min. 0.0; Mean 0.1267114093959744; Max. 1.0; StDev 0.3326940671408481

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:CX0dlrHkouxbY4QB0flWGg==

=1 in the year when US imposed sanctions; =0 o/w (TIES)

f2694275 Location:

Summary Statistics: StDev 0.20518232003841802; Max. 1.0; Mean 0.04402684563758393; Valid 3725.0; Min. 0.0;

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:EFn1WaRqMNMgH7DgVqKaeQ==

Relative political reach (working population) Kugler & Tammen

f2694275 Location:

Summary Statistics: Min. 0.2370000034570694; StDev 0.2613058109872099; Mean 1.0257300936176115; Max. 1.6759999990463257; Valid 3190.0;

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:HefIXf1Kd88tkSdfCuY+bA==

Relative political reach (econ. active population) Kugler & Tammen

f2694275 Location:

Summary Statistics: Max. 1.3109999895095825; Valid 3190.0; Mean 1.0154548586535974; Min. 0.5730000138282776; StDev 0.1360235221438853

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:R+/WBvZAiYdK80XACb5/sw==

Total # of any intl attacks (GTD)

f2694275 Location:

Summary Statistics: Min. 0.0; Max. 57.0; Mean 0.5347651006711379; Valid 3725.0; StDev 2.4857676469655177;

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:DdmopGqP3K7t+wxsNnFCyg==

years since the last attack

f2694275 Location:

Summary Statistics: Mean 6.939328859060391; Max. 36.0; Min. 0.0; Valid 3725.0; StDev 7.039902541842713

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:fUV42OunY1dbCakc1e7hzA==

= no_attack_years^2

f2694275 Location:

Summary Statistics: StDev 167.78482560297817; Mean 97.70120805369172; Max. 1296.0; Min. 0.0; Valid 3725.0

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:YpDzN6CdBoWWmFUcgVc2iQ==

= no_attack_years^3

f2694275 Location:

Summary Statistics: StDev 4297.15456066039; Max. 46656.0; Min. 0.0; Valid 3725.0; Mean 1784.0732885905938;

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:MR9PpeIKX+n90lDiafiaJQ==

Other Study-Related Materials

Label:

replication_dofile.do

Text:

.Do file to replicate analysis

Notes:

application/x-stata-syntax