Replication Data for: Punish or Tolerate? State Capacity, Military Oversight and Wartime Sexual Violence (doi:10.7910/DVN/VWJIUQ)

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Document Description

Citation

Title:

Replication Data for: Punish or Tolerate? State Capacity, Military Oversight and Wartime Sexual Violence

Identification Number:

doi:10.7910/DVN/VWJIUQ

Distributor:

Harvard Dataverse

Date of Distribution:

2023-05-08

Version:

1

Bibliographic Citation:

Tomashevskiy, Andrey; Lee, Sumin, 2023, "Replication Data for: Punish or Tolerate? State Capacity, Military Oversight and Wartime Sexual Violence", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/VWJIUQ, Harvard Dataverse, V1

Study Description

Citation

Title:

Replication Data for: Punish or Tolerate? State Capacity, Military Oversight and Wartime Sexual Violence

Identification Number:

doi:10.7910/DVN/VWJIUQ

Authoring Entity:

Tomashevskiy, Andrey (Rutgers University)

Lee, Sumin (Rutgers The State University of New Jersey)

Distributor:

Harvard Dataverse

Access Authority:

Interactions, International

Depositor:

Interactions, International

Date of Deposit:

2023-02-16

Holdings Information:

https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/VWJIUQ

Study Scope

Keywords:

Social Sciences, Conflict, Security, Human rights

Abstract:

How does government oversight of the military affect the occurrence of wartime sexual violence? This paper highlights the role of civil-military relations and state capacity in the occurrence of sexual violence. Building on research that examines wartime sexual violence in the principal-agent framework, we propose a game-theoretic model in which the military deploys wartime sexual violence based on its expectation of government oversight. We describe an equilibrium where monitoring is an informative signal of the government' s capacity to carry out punishment. The government monitors strategically and may choose to remain ' strategically ignorant' of the military' s conduct. Since government oversight is an informative signal of state capacity, the military abstains from wartime sexual violence when oversight is high. We examine the empirical implications of the model using data on sexual violence, military oversight and state capacity and find support for the hypotheses generated by the model.

Methodology and Processing

Sources Statement

Data Access

Other Study Description Materials

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Label:

master.csv

Notes:

text/csv

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Label:

model_final.R

Notes:

type/x-r-syntax