Persistent Identifier
|
doi:10.7910/DVN/IPGCTN |
Publication Date
|
2024-09-10 |
Title
| Replication Data for: Biased Bureaucrats and the Policies of International Organizations |
Author
| Lang, ValentinUniversity of Mannheim
Kentikelenis, AlexandrosBocconi University
Wellner, LukasMonash University |
Point of Contact
|
Use email button above to contact.
Lang, Valentin (University of Mannheim) |
Description
| This article advances a novel argument about the policy output of international organizations (IOs) by highlighting the role of individual staffers. We approach them as purposive actors carrying heterogeneous ideological biases that materially shape their policy choices on the job. Pursuing this argument with an empirical focus on the International Monetary Fund (IMF), we collected individual-level information on the careers of 835 IMF “mission chiefs”—staffers with primary responsibility for a particular member state—and matched them to newly-coded data on more than 15,000 IMF-mandated policy conditions over the 1980–2016 period. Leveraging the appointment of the same mission chief to different countries throughout their career, we find that individual staffers influence the number, scope, and content of IMF conditions according to their personal ideological biases. These results contribute to our understanding of the micro-foundations behind IO output, and have implications for the accountability and legitimacy of IOs. |
Subject
| Social Sciences |
Keyword
| IMF Mission Chiefs and Conditionality |
Notes
| This dataset underwent an independent verification process, complying with the AJPS Verification Policy updated June 2023, which replicated the tables and figures in the primary article. For the supplementary materials, verification was performed solely for the successful execution of the code. The verification process was carried out by the Cornell Center for Social Sciences at Cornell University.
The associated article has been awarded the Open Materials Badge. Learn more about the Open Practice Badges from the Center for Open Science.
Open Materials Badge |
Producer
| Valentin Lang |
Depositor
| Lang, Valentin |
Deposit Date
| 2024-06-03 |
Data Source
| Bailey, M. A., Strezhnev, A., & Voeten, E. (2017). Estimating Dynamic State Preferences from United Nations Voting Data. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 61(2), 430–456.;
Dreher, A., Lang, V., Peter Rosendorff, B., & Vreeland, J. R. (2022). Bilateral or Multilateral? International Financial Flows and the Dirty-Work Hypothesis. Journal of Politics, 84(4), 1932–1946.;
IMF (n.d.) International Financial Statistics. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund.;
Kentikelenis, A., & Stubbs, T. (2023). A Thousand Cuts: Social Protection in the Age of Austerity. Oxford University Press.;
Laeven, L., & Valencia, F. (2020). Systemic Banking Crises Database II. IMF Economic Review, 68, 307-361.;
Önder, A. S., & Terviö, M. (2015). Is Economics a House Divided? Analysis of Citation Networks. Economic Inquiry, 53(3), 1491–1505.;
World Bank (n.d.) World Development Indicators. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank |