1 to 10 of 28 Results
William Chandler; Gary W. Cox; Mathew D. McCubbins, 2009, "Replication data for: Agenda Control in the Bundestag, 1987-2002", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/WYMGZI, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:3:vCmCkQ9gJ0X4OUcCYq16Ig== [fileUNF]
We find strong evidence of monopoly legislative agenda control by government parties in the Bundestag. First, the government parties have near-zero roll rates, while the opposition parties are often rolled over half the time. Second, only opposition parties’ (and not government parties’) roll rates increase with the distances of each party from the... |
Jan 20, 2009
Mathew D. McCubbins, 2009, "U.S. Presidential Vetoes, 1st Congress -100th Congress", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/AD6X6R, Harvard Dataverse, V1
Kiewiet, D. Roderick, and Mathew D. McCubbins. The Logic Of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Spring 1991. |
Gary W. Cox; Mikitaka Masuyama; Mathew D. McCubbins, 2009, "Replication data for: Agenda Power in the Japanese House of Representatives", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/K7IDCQ, Harvard Dataverse, V1
Data for this study are forthcoming. In this paper we provide evidence from Japan that bears on a general theory of agenda power in legislatures. By agenda power we mean the power to determine (a) which bills are considered in the plenary session of the legislature, and (b) restrictions on debate and amendment for these bills, when they are conside... |
Jan 20, 2009
Chris Den Hartog, 2009, "Replication data for: Limited Party Government and the Majority Party Revolution in the Nineteenth-Century House", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/8QE22T, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:3:1GsPCQArqsWiISym5xLeCg== [fileUNF]
Though we know much about majority party agenda control in the House of Representatives during the “modern” period from the 1890’s forward, far less is known about agenda control prior to that time. There are numerous reasons to suspect that the majority party lacked agenda control during most of the 1800’s. This suggests that we may have missed th... |
Jan 20, 2009
Mathew D. McCubbins, 2009, "U.S. Appropriations Data, 1946-1985", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/CXCXBG, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:3:zsBZ4rzHY0qKWFkHdB+I3w== [fileUNF]
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Gary W. Cox; William B. Heller; Mathew D. McCubbins, 2009, "Replication data for: Agenda Power in the Italian Chamber of Deputies: 1988 to 2000", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/DFWCBA, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:3:iJ+DwkYwdJCynIu/GuUqWA== [fileUNF]
We find strong evidence that governing coalitions in Italy exercise significant negative agenda powers. First, governing parties have a roll rate that is nearly zero, and their roll rate is lower than opposition parties’ roll rates, which average about 20% on all final passage votes. Second, we find that, controlling for distance from the floor med... |
Mathew D. McCubbins, 2009, "The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/WIO4PQ, Harvard Dataverse, V1
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Jan 20, 2009
Mathew D. McCubbins, 2009, "U.S. Congressional Rules Data", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/TKGV6U, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:3:j0MH/Y6//KtIjuI9xDsi6g== [fileUNF]
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Jan 20, 2009
Mathew D. McCubbins, 2009, "Event Studies", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/TGAL1L, Harvard Dataverse, V1
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Octavio Amorim Neto; Gary W. Cox; Mathew D. McCubbins, 2009, "Replication data for: Agenda Power in Brazil's Câmara dos Deputados, 1989 to 1998", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/UE7H6Q, Harvard Dataverse, V1
This study examines a general proposition about democratic legislatures—that their agenda will be cartelized by any majority government—in the context of a case study of the Brazilian Câmara dos Deputados (Chamber of Deputies). Our main question concerns when consistent agenda control by a single majority coalition, as opposed to agenda control by... |
