161 to 166 of 166 Results
Apr 16, 2019
Naurin, Daniel; Naurin, Elin; Alexander, Amy, 2019, "Replication Data for: Gender stereotyping and chivalry in international negotiations. A survey experiment in the Council of the European Union", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/3LEWIE, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:6:irt191qQgExZ0goIryXqoQ== [fileUNF]
We argue that gender stereotypes—stylized expectations of individuals' traits and capabilities based on their gender—may affect the behavior of diplomats and the processes of international negotiations. Specifically, we find in a survey experiment in the Council of the European Union, that female representatives behaving stereotypically weak and vu... |
Jan 28, 2019
Kalyanpur, Nikhil; Newman, Abraham L., 2019, "Replication Data for: Mobilizing Market Power: Jurisdictional Expansion as Economic Statecraft", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/WOKBPF, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:6:VxjrxmWtq1PWIUy376/Sgw== [fileUNF]
States with large markets routinely compete with one another to shield domestic regulatory policies from global pressure, export their rules to other jurisdictions, and provide their firms with competitive advantages. Most arguments about market power tend to operationalize the concept in economic terms. In this paper, we argue that a state's abili... |
Jan 28, 2019
Fjelde, Hanne; Hultman, Lisa; Nilsson, Desirée, 2019, "Replication Data for: Protection Through Presence: UN Peacekeeping and the Costs of Targeting Civilians", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/FD8O8W, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:6:u/EWLbsYg54lLMmyyWka6A== [fileUNF]
Are UN peacekeepers effective in protecting civilians from violence? Existing studies examine this issue at the country level, thereby making it difficult to isolate the effect of peacekeepers and to assess the actual mechanism at work. We provide the first comprehensive evaluation of UN peacekeeping success in protecting civilians at the subnation... |
Jan 28, 2019
Lehmann, Todd C.; Zhukov, Yuri M., 2019, "Replication Data for: Until the Bitter End? The Diffusion of Surrender Across Battles", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/S3K4RH, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:6:tMoqtHP9N35hF3yyHsUWIg== [fileUNF]
Why do armies sometimes surrender to the enemy and sometimes fight to the bitter end? Existing research has highlighted the importance of battlefield resolve for the onset, conduct, and outcome of war, but has left these life-and-death decisions mostly unexplained. We know little about why battle-level surrender occurs, and why it stops. In this pa... |
Jan 28, 2019
Bartusevičius, Henrikas; Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede, 2019, "Replication Data for: A Two-Stage Approach to Civil Conflict: Contested Incompatibilities and Armed Violence", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/ZGM9HF, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:6:G4JHTWVX2I/8irWyKig1ew== [fileUNF]
We present a two-stage approach to civil conflict analysis. Unlike conventional approaches that focus only on armed conflict and treat all other cases as “at peace,” we first distinguish cases with and without contested incompatibilities (Stage 1) and then whether or not contested incompatibilities escalate to armed conflict (Stage 2). This allows... |
Lipscy, Phillip Y.; Lee, Haillie Na-Kyung, 2019, "Replication Data for: The IMF As a Biased Global Insurance Mechanism: Asymmetrical Moral Hazard, Reserve Accumulation, and Financial Crises", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/J1WQHI, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:6:C4LFY1zqG8HfzjwgJofUuQ== [fileUNF]
A large literature has established that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is heavily politicized. We argue that this politicization has important consequences for international reserve accumulation and financial crises. The IMF generates moral hazard asymmetrically, reducing the expected costs of risky lending and policies for states that are p... |
