11 to 20 of 26 Results
Jun 23, 2022 - Harvard Dataverse
Bernhard, Regan; Jonathan Phillips, 2021, "It's not what you did, it's what you could have done", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/B8WAKM, Harvard Dataverse, V3, UNF:6:JCnblky+hdtr39QP3H5wXA== [fileUNF]
Data for the manuscript entitled, "It's not what you did, it's what you could have done" |
Phillips, Jonathan; Desmond Ong; Andrew Surtees; Yijing Xin; Samantha Williams; Rebecca Saxe; Michael Frank, 2020, "A Second Look at Automatic Theory of Mind: Reconsidering Kovács, Téglás, and Endress (2010)", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/QBJX4E, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:6:61TIN1In3RhQZiQAnj0IpA== [fileUNF]
In recent work, Kovács, Téglás, and Endress (2010) argued that human adults automatically represented other agents’ beliefs even when those beliefs were completely irrelevant to the task being performed. In a series of 13 experiments, we replicated these previous findings but demonstrated that the effects found arose from artifacts in the experimen... |
Phillips, Jonathan; Jonathan Kominsky, 2020, "Causation and norms of proper functioning: Counterfactuals are (still) relevant", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/JON1LK, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:6:rU68RFoqjMhChXIaHEmHRg== [fileUNF]
Causal judgments are well-known to be sensitive to violations of both moral and statistical norms. There is ongoing discussion as to whether both effects are best explained through changes in the relevance of counterfactual possibilities, or if moral norm violations should be independently explained through a potential polysemy in the word 'cause'.... |
Dec 22, 2020 - Harvard Dataverse
Adam Morris; Phillips, Jonathan; Tobias Gerstenberg; Fiery Cushman, 2020, "Quantitative causal selection patterns in token causation", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/LMIJW7, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:6:VXrCyAjlNy7jgSbzfKn4WQ== [fileUNF]
When many events contributed to an outcome, people consistently judge some more causal than others, based in part on the prior probabilities of those events. For instance, when a tree bursts into flames, people judge the lightning strike more of a cause than the presence of oxygen in the air—in part because oxygen is so common, and lightning strike... |
Scherer, Hailey; Phillips, Jonathan, 2020, "Top-Down Effects on Anthropomorphism of a Robot", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/B1O1ZQ, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:6:REYpFklLkHTuKqlMEYjDbQ== [fileUNF]
This repository contains the supporting materials for the manuscript: Top-Down Effects on Anthropomorphism of a Robot. The analysis script (written in R) is titled "analyses.R" and reads in the data (in .csv format) for the different parts of the experiment labeled "data_X.csv". The manuscript and associated figures are also available. The complete... |
Phillips, Jonathan; Cushman, Fiery, 2020, "Morality constrains the default representation of what is possible", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/BHWK54, Harvard Dataverse, V2, UNF:6:xHufgWAI8YD92bwY1GPiRQ== [fileUNF]
As humans, we think not only about what is, but also what could be. These representations of alternative possibilities support many important cognitive functions, such as predicting others’ future actions, assigning responsibility for past events, and making moral judgments. We perform many of these tasks quickly and effortlessly, which suggests ac... |
Phillips, Jonathan; George, B. R., 2020, "Knowledge wh and False Beliefs: Experimental Investigations", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/RFSCON, Harvard Dataverse, V2, UNF:6:oK7vr4v5GhPxazNPZv83AQ== [fileUNF]
A common approach to knowledge wh is to try to reduce it to knowledge that, and in particular to answer-knowledge. On this view, the truth- conditions of a knowledge wh ascription can be given entirely in terms of which answers to the embedded question the subject knows. Against this background, this paper considers the phenomenon of false-belief s... |
Phillips, Jonathan; Luguri, Jamie; Knobe, Joshua, 2020, "Unifying morality’s influence on non-moral judgments: The relevance of alternative possibilities", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/9WKDRK, Harvard Dataverse, V2, UNF:6:UI1nlM5TiC/YKXedYxXhhA== [fileUNF]
Past work has demonstrated that people’s moral judgments can influence their judgments in a number of domains that might seem to involve straightforward matters of fact, including judgments about freedom, causation, the doing/allowing distinction, and intentional action. The present studies explore whether the effect of morality in these four domai... |
Phillips, Jonathan; De Freitas, Julian; Mott, Christian; Gruber, June; Knobe, Joshua, 2020, "True happiness: The role of morality in the folk concept of happiness", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/NLVB3E, Harvard Dataverse, V2, UNF:6:i8pM24Ew21mYkFsqCnuuNQ== [fileUNF]
Recent scientific research has settled on a purely descriptive definition of happiness that is focused solely on agents’ psychological states (high positive affect, low negative affect, high life satisfaction). In contrast to this understanding, recent research has suggested that the ordinary concept of happiness is also sensitive to the moral valu... |
Phillips, Jonathan; Mandelkern, Matthew, 2020, "Sticky situations: Force and quantifier domains", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/RO1QHX, Harvard Dataverse, V2, UNF:6:IvLz1r/GjG4myvHFkM7kVA== [fileUNF]
When do we judge that someone was forced to do what they did? One relatively well-established finding is that subjects tend to judge that agents were not forced to do actions when those actions violate norms. A surprising discovery of Young & Phillips 2011 is that this effect seems to disappear when we frame the relevant ‘force’-claim in the active... |
