1 to 7 of 7 Results
Nov 27, 2007
Christopher Gelpi, 2007, "Replication data for: Democratic Diversions: Governmental Structure and the Externalization of Domestic Conflict", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/WDQQXW, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:3:ftr/JBzOl8VQ5RUEL+/jKQ== [fileUNF]
Students of international politics have often argued that state leaders initiate the use of force internationally to divert attention away from domestic problems. The author contends that these arguments concerning the relationship between domestic unrest and international conflict are not supported empirically because they focus too narrowly on th... |
Nov 27, 2007
Christopher Gelpi; Peter Feaver; and Jason Reifler, 2007, "Replication data for: Success Matters: Casualty Sensitivity and the War in Iraq", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/OHIOTF, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:3:fYjf/4VE41/INDUUItWP2Q== [fileUNF]
Since the Vietnam War, U.S. policymakers have worried that the American public will support military operations only if the human costs of the war, as measured in combat casualties, are minimal. Although the public is rightly averse to suffering casualties, the level of popular sensitivity to U.S. military casualties depends critically on the conte... |
Christopher Gelpi; Peter Feaver, 2007, "Replication data for: Speak Softly and Carry a Big Stick? Veterans in the Policy Making Elite and the American Use of Force", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/RRNIDP, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:3:mFShltO+HtkRhGz0bIjnxA== [fileUNF]
Other research has shown (1) that civilians and the military differ in their views about when and how to use military force; (2) that the opinions of veterans track more closely with military officers than with civilians who never served in the military; and (3) that U.S. civil–military relations shaped Cold War policy debates. We assess whether th... |
Nov 27, 2007
Christopher Gelpi, 2007, "Replication data for: The Power of Legitimacy: The Role of Norms in Crisis Bargaining", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/2MQ09Y, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:3:voIS7SxqACoJrj1J7YDuwg== [fileUNF]
A major departure from mainstream security studies, this book mounts a thoughtful challenge to realist theories of crisis bargaining. It tests the proposition that normative standards of behavior influence state actions in security-related conflicts. Specifically, it examines the construction of bilateral norms as the settlements of security-relate... |
Nov 27, 2007 - American Political Science Review Dataverse
Christopher Gelpi; Michael Griesdorf, 2007, "Replication data for: Winners or Losers? Democracies in International Crises", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/DA7BA3, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:3:4PzXsLLPg6/56MsxycSR8Q== [fileUNF]
We attempt to explain when and why democratic states will prevail in international crises. We review several of the prominent theories about democratic political structures and derive hypotheses from each framework about crisis outcomes. These hypotheses are tested against the population of 422 international crises between 1918 and 1994. Our findin... |
Nov 27, 2007
Christopher Gelpi, 2007, "Replication data for: Alliances as Instruments of Intra-Allied Control", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/4TTKXQ, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:3:4ByHAe+3SLnWVYphwjVXWg== [fileUNF]
International institutions play important roles in political-military issues as well as in economic and environmental affairs. Indeed, it is impossible to understand efforts to resolve regional and local conflicts, or the form and pace of alliance formation and expansion, without paying attention to security institutions. Imperfect Unions discusses... |
Nov 27, 2007
Christopher Gelpi; Joseph M. Grieco, 2007, "Replication data for: Attracting Trouble: Democracy, Leadership Tenure, and the Targeting of Militarized Challenges", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/JKBAHM, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:3:2dhjp7C91WM4Nubh56Ls1Q== [fileUNF]
Otherwise powerful, formidable democracies are tempting targets for international violence because they have leaders who, on average, have been in office for shorter periods of time than leaders of autocracies. Domestic incentives may make resistance more costly than offering concessions for inexperienced leaders of both democratic and authoritaria... |
