1 to 9 of 9 Results
Mar 28, 2016
Broz, J. Lawrence, 2016, "Replication Data for: "The Politics of Rescuing the World's Financial System: The Federal Reserve as a Global Lender of Last Resort." Korean Journal of International Studies 13, 2 (August 2015): 323-351.", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/IMBNQD, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:6:DqBs5gQvgQX/PRepo8mfhg== [fileUNF]
During the financial crisis of 2007-10, the Federal Reserve (Fed) served as a global lender of last resort by establishing currency swap agreements with 14 foreign central banks, including several in East Asia. These agreements were controversial internationally because the Fed selectively established swaps with some central banks and not others, r... |
Feb 10, 2011
J. Lawrence Broz, 2011, "Replication data for: The United States Congress and IMF Financing, 1944-2009", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/UUUPBI, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:5:VPZgtEsAmtvVjT+MQt6TZw== [fileUNF]
Since 1944, United States financing of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has been appropriated and approved in Congress by roll-call vote. If voting to increase funds to the IMF is viewed as an observable signal of “support” for the IMF, these votes provide a historical record of legislative support for the IMF in the United States. I analyze r... |
Feb 10, 2011
J. Lawrence Broz; Michael Brewster Hawes, 2011, "Replication data for: Congressional Politics of Financing the International Monetary Fund", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/5ZGNDG, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:5:r5s0K6BiPTMdrbj8mOYbKg== [fileUNF]
We address the question of how international public goods are financed by analyzing voting in the U.S. Congress on legislation to increase the U.S. contribution to the IMF. We argue that legislators are more likely to vote in favor of an increase (1) the more campaign contributions they obtain from banks that specialize in international lending, an... |
Oct 4, 2010
J. Lawrence Broz; Jeffry Frieden; Stephen Weymouth, 2010, "Replication data for: Exchange-Rate Policy Attitudes: Direct Evidence from Survey Data", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/AEMELF, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:3:QjySqIrDHvQGy2pL8BP6kQ== [fileUNF]
Analyses of the political economy of exchange-rate policy posit that firms and individuals in different sectors of the economy have distinct policy attitudes toward the level and the stability of the exchange rate. Most such approaches hypothesize that internationally exposed firms prefer more stable currencies, and that tradables producers prefer... |
Oct 4, 2010
J Lawrence Broz, 2010, "Replication data for: "Congressional Voting on Funding the International Financial Institutions."", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/IXPG3C, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:3:+VjMfUUKwiYm/HT/rogWqw== [fileUNF]
The United States is the largest contributor to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, providing resources in exchange for voting power in these international financial institutions (IFIs). While the Treasury Department manages the day-to-day aspects of US participation in these institutions, Congress retains authority on funding... |
Oct 4, 2010
J. Lawrence Broz; Michael Plouffe, 2010, "Replication data for: The Effectiveness of Monetary Policy Anchors: Firm-Level Evidence.", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/NDVCQ2, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:5:Wkjjc4sJS9AnFcbMfYIwlA== [fileUNF]
Analyses of monetary policy posit that exchange-rate pegs, inflation targets, and central bank independence can help anchor private-sector inflation expectations. Yet there are few direct tests of this argument. We offer cross-national, micro-level evidence on the effectiveness of monetary anchors in controlling private-sector inflation concerns. U... |
Feb 20, 2008
J. Lawrence Broz, 2008, "Replication data for: Congressional Politics of International Financial Rescues", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/G91T35, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:3:qsWyV8J1CYkRfYPGaQrvLQ== [fileUNF]
In the 1990s, the American executive organized financial rescues for Mexico and several Asian economies. These rescues were controversial in Congress, where members voted repeatedly to reduce or eliminate the executive’s freedom to engage in them. I analyze these roll calls with an eye toward explaining who opposes and who supports international fi... |
Nov 27, 2007
J. Lawrence Broz; Michael Brewster Hawes, 2007, "Replication data for: U.S. Domestic Politics and International Monetary Fund Policy", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/J6UKTC, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:3:eMF1DhyWlyep9jCjCMh9+g== [fileUNF]
We examine the political motivations that shape International Monetary Fund lending decisions. While we focus on the IMF’s most powerful member – the United States – we abandon the typical “national interest” reasoning in favor of a micro-incentive approach that connects the motivations of U.S. officials at the Fund to domestic politics. We argue t... |
Nov 27, 2007
J. Lawrence Broz, 2007, "Replication data for: Political System Transparency and Monetary Commitment Regimes", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/IY28SP, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:3:srp1CYsa0rWQGpLLysOZvQ== [fileUNF]
Central bank independence (CBI) and fixed exchange rates are alternative monetary commitments that differ in transparency. While CBI is opaque and difficult to monitor, a commitment to a fixed exchange rate is easily observed. Political systems also vary in terms of transparency. I argue that the transparency of monetary commitments and the transpa... |
