11 to 20 of 57 Results
MS Word - 91.0 KB -
MD5: cb38c0e1772ab7b280c0dd8bfe45fb84
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MS Word - 76.5 KB -
MD5: 890998abe47ec9623d27db014461100f
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Tabular Data - 4.6 MB - 331 Variables, 6272 Observations - UNF:3:ULGnDIcn934ow2cJdpeTPg==
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Tabular Data - 4.6 MB - 331 Variables, 6272 Observations - UNF:3:1z81Lim72Q8DnPJYV+pYXw==
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Tabular Data - 4.5 MB - 327 Variables, 6272 Observations - UNF:3:uTSak+KRQMVOmgYB32d1PA==
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Tabular Data - 2.2 MB - 143 Variables, 6542 Observations - UNF:3:kjCnA5wce6++MIG++URauw==
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Jan 27, 2009
Paul Huth; Todd Allee, 2009, "Legitimizing Dispute Settlement: International Legal Rulings as Domestic Political Cover", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/ENCG2C, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:3:Amo6CG4+GRcxQjJbdEY56w== [fileUNF]
We develop and test a general argument about the conditions under which state leaders are most likely to choose legal dispute resolution over bilateral negotiations as a means to settle international disputes. Our central claim is that leaders who anticipate significant domestic audience costs for the making of voluntary, negotiated concessions are... |
Jan 27, 2009 -
Legitimizing Dispute Settlement: International Legal Rulings as Domestic Political Cover
Plain Text - 6.6 KB -
MD5: 612f1330487577c723f6fd2dae528e31
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Jan 27, 2009 -
Legitimizing Dispute Settlement: International Legal Rulings as Domestic Political Cover
Tabular Data - 519.7 KB - 138 Variables, 1504 Observations - UNF:3:NZoIra8zNFcfahOguz1AmA==
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Jan 27, 2009 -
Legitimizing Dispute Settlement: International Legal Rulings as Domestic Political Cover
Tabular Data - 519.7 KB - 138 Variables, 1504 Observations - UNF:3:NZoIra8zNFcfahOguz1AmA==
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