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1 to 10 of 15 Results

Replication data for: Identifying the Culprit: Democracy, Dictatorship, and Dispute Initiation Dec 15, 2008 - American Political Science Review Dataverse Dan Reiter; Allan C. Stam, 2008, "Replication data for: Identifying the Culprit: Democracy, Dictatorship, and Dispute Initiation", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/FLJMRM, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:3:XtXFHAkEPsrXk1q62M8L4Q== [fileUNF] Peceny, Beer, and Sanchez-Terry (2002) find that interstate dyads containing a democracy and a personalist dictatorship are more likely than other types of dyads to experience militarized disputes. They argue that this is because democracies are especially likely to challenge personalist dictatorships. Unfortunately, they do not identify which stat...
doublereduce.tab Dec 15, 2008 - Replication data for: Identifying the Culprit: Democracy, Dictatorship, and Dispute Initiation Tabular Data - 123.5 MB - 36 Variables, 801124 Observations - UNF:3:XtXFHAkEPsrXk1q62M8L4Q== 1. Data Data file for this study
doublereduce.zip Dec 15, 2008 - Replication data for: Identifying the Culprit: Democracy, Dictatorship, and Dispute Initiation ZIP Archive - 6.1 MB - MD5: 7c49ee9ee4dbf44e296737b96c42d2e4 1. Data Zip file containing data for this study in original format
Reiter Stam APSR May 03 rep.txt Dec 15, 2008 - Replication data for: Identifying the Culprit: Democracy, Dictatorship, and Dispute Initiation Plain Text - 24.2 KB - MD5: 3e85e4775cf5d0f64aad0b39e13d3d18 1. Data Data for this study in text file format
Replication data for: Win, Lose or Draw: Domestic Politics and the Crucible of War Nov 27, 2007 Allan Stam III, 2007, "Replication data for: Win, Lose or Draw: Domestic Politics and the Crucible of War", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/YJ3FWM, Harvard Dataverse, V1 While the factors affecting the initiation of war have been extensively studied, the factors that determine the outcome of war have been neglected. Using quantitative data and historical illustrations from the early 1800s to the late 1980s, Allan Stam investigates the relative effect on war outcomes of both the choices leaders must make during war...
WinLoseorDraw.xls Nov 27, 2007 - Replication data for: Win, Lose or Draw: Domestic Politics and the Crucible of War Unknown - 628.0 KB - MD5: 79c6c34f097d207f0c1267931628997d 1. Data Complex data spreadsheet
Replication data for: Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory Nov 27, 2007 - American Political Science Review Dataverse Allan Stam III; Dan Reiter, 2007, "Replication data for: Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/YYUVW7, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:3:zqWn0b+Go28x1rpGxeSpbA== [fileUNF] How do nation-states' political institutions affect the relations between states? This article addresses that question by testing the predictions of different theories linking political institutions to war outcomes. Specifically, rent-seeking and regime legitimacy theories predict that all democratic belligerents are more likely to win wars because...
Chixhawkapsr.tab Nov 27, 2007 - Replication data for: Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory Tabular Data - 25.9 KB - 31 Variables, 197 Observations - UNF:3:zqWn0b+Go28x1rpGxeSpbA== 1. Data Data File
Chixhawkapsr.zip Nov 27, 2007 - Replication data for: Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory ZIP Archive - 8.2 KB - MD5: a1b6e3f03c6e8c64b8c048e6c5f168fa 1. Data Data file in original Stata format
Replication data for: Political Institutions, Coercive Diplomacy, and the Duration of Economic Sanctions Nov 27, 2007 Fiona McGillivray; Allan C. Stam III, 2007, "Replication data for: Political Institutions, Coercive Diplomacy, and the Duration of Economic Sanctions", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/RB1USI, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:3:UTImW6pM1r+f13kfNEYJrQ== [fileUNF] A theory of sanction duration that focuses on differences between democratic and nondemocratic states in the structure of leaders’ support coalitions is tested, using a hazard model to analyze a data set of 47 sanction events with 272 observations. Results show that leadership change strongly affects the duration of sanctions only in the case of no...

Replication data for: Identifying the Culprit: Democracy, Dictatorship, and Dispute Initiation

Dec 15, 2008 - American Political Science Review Dataverse

Dan Reiter; Allan C. Stam, 2008, "Replication data for: Identifying the Culprit: Democracy, Dictatorship, and Dispute Initiation", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/FLJMRM, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:3:XtXFHAkEPsrXk1q62M8L4Q== [fileUNF]

Peceny, Beer, and Sanchez-Terry (2002) find that interstate dyads containing a democracy and a personalist dictatorship are more likely than other types of dyads to experience militarized disputes. They argue that this is because democracies are especially likely to challenge personalist dictatorships. Unfortunately, they do not identify which stat...

doublereduce.tab

Dec 15, 2008 - Replication data for: Identifying the Culprit: Democracy, Dictatorship, and Dispute Initiation

Tabular Data - 123.5 MB - 36 Variables, 801124 Observations -

1. Data

Data file for this study

doublereduce.zip

Dec 15, 2008 - Replication data for: Identifying the Culprit: Democracy, Dictatorship, and Dispute Initiation

ZIP Archive - 6.1 MB -

1. Data

Zip file containing data for this study in original format

Reiter Stam APSR May 03 rep.txt

Dec 15, 2008 - Replication data for: Identifying the Culprit: Democracy, Dictatorship, and Dispute Initiation

Plain Text - 24.2 KB -

1. Data

Data for this study in text file format

Replication data for: Win, Lose or Draw: Domestic Politics and the Crucible of War

Nov 27, 2007

Allan Stam III, 2007, "Replication data for: Win, Lose or Draw: Domestic Politics and the Crucible of War", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/YJ3FWM, Harvard Dataverse, V1

While the factors affecting the initiation of war have been extensively studied, the factors that determine the outcome of war have been neglected. Using quantitative data and historical illustrations from the early 1800s to the late 1980s, Allan Stam investigates the relative effect on war outcomes of both the choices leaders must make during war...

WinLoseorDraw.xls

Nov 27, 2007 - Replication data for: Win, Lose or Draw: Domestic Politics and the Crucible of War

Unknown - 628.0 KB -

1. Data

Complex data spreadsheet

Replication data for: Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory

Nov 27, 2007 - American Political Science Review Dataverse

Allan Stam III; Dan Reiter, 2007, "Replication data for: Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/YYUVW7, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:3:zqWn0b+Go28x1rpGxeSpbA== [fileUNF]

How do nation-states' political institutions affect the relations between states? This article addresses that question by testing the predictions of different theories linking political institutions to war outcomes. Specifically, rent-seeking and regime legitimacy theories predict that all democratic belligerents are more likely to win wars because...

Chixhawkapsr.tab

Nov 27, 2007 - Replication data for: Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory

Tabular Data - 25.9 KB - 31 Variables, 197 Observations -

1. Data

Data File

Chixhawkapsr.zip

Nov 27, 2007 - Replication data for: Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory

ZIP Archive - 8.2 KB -

1. Data

Data file in original Stata format

Replication data for: Political Institutions, Coercive Diplomacy, and the Duration of Economic Sanctions

Nov 27, 2007

Fiona McGillivray; Allan C. Stam III, 2007, "Replication data for: Political Institutions, Coercive Diplomacy, and the Duration of Economic Sanctions", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/RB1USI, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:3:UTImW6pM1r+f13kfNEYJrQ== [fileUNF]

A theory of sanction duration that focuses on differences between democratic and nondemocratic states in the structure of leaders’ support coalitions is tested, using a hazard model to analyze a data set of 47 sanction events with 272 observations. Results show that leadership change strongly affects the duration of sanctions only in the case of no...

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