Replication data for: Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House. Second Edition.

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Gary W. Cox; Mathew D. McCubbins, 2009, "Replication data for: Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House. Second Edition.", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/LCOZIW, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:3:1Mnul5XvkbEKXBpjz/1POg== [fileUNF]

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Description	Scholars who compare political parties invariably conclude that American parties are much weaker than their European counterparts: they are much less cohesive on legislative votes; their influence over the flow of legislation is less complete; they control but a small fraction of campaign money; they exercise almost no control over nominations; the list could go on. Within the American context, observers have commonly concluded that parties influence legislators less than pressure groups, political action committees, or constituents. Much of the literature of the 1970s and 1980s, moreover, was devoted to the thesis that American parties were declining--both in the electoral and the legislative arenas. If parties are so weak, then what are the organizing principles of American politics? The literature provides a ready stock of answers: In the electoral arena, it is the individual ca ndidates who have the most powerful organizations, who collect the most money, and who define the course of electoral campaigns. In the legislative arena, it is above all the standing committees of Congress--and, in the 1970s and 1980s, their subcommittees--that are the centers of power. The standard wisdom on the postwar Congress was that it had been an exercise first in "committee government," then in "subcommittee government." Party government usually received mention only as something conspicuously absent. This study reevaluates the role of parties and committees, and the interactions between them, in the post-World War II House of Representatives. Our view is that parties in the House--especially majority parties--are a species of "legislative cartel." These cartels seize the power, theoretically resident in the House, to make rules governing the structure and process of legislation. Possession of this rule-making power leads to two main consequences. First, the legislative process in general--and the committee system in particular--is stacked in favor of majority party interests. Second, because members of the majority party have all the structural advantages, the key players in most legislative deals are members of the majority party and the majority party's central agreements are facilitated by cartel rules and policed by the cartel's leadership.
Related Publication	Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2006. Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House. Second Edition. Cambridge University Press. article available here
Notes	Subject: STANDARD DEPOSIT TERMS 1.0 Type: DATAPASS:TERMS:STANDARD:1.0 Notes: This study was deposited under the of the Data-PASS standard deposit terms. A copy of the usage agreement is included in the file section of this study.;
License/Data Use Agreement	CC0 1.0

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	ANALYSES.zip ZIP Archive - 701.2 KB Published Jan 20, 2009 27 Downloads MD5: 655d63b64cc5b212d0b650be5164db57 General Accounts Files, Zip file containing analyses documents 2d. Japanese Budget Data	Preview "ANALYSES.zip" Access File File Access Public Download Options ZIP Archive Download Metadata Data File Citation Download EndNote XML Download RIS Download BibTeX
	APP-BE-E.AS1 Plain Text - 407.3 KB Published Jan 20, 2009 25 Downloads MD5: 6c8ff9e02e5aeb151393cda7bf142cb3 Data file for this study in ASCII format 2e. U.S. Appropriations Data, 1946-1985 - AGENCY/ ITEM LEVEL	Access File File Access Public Download Options Plain Text Download Metadata Data File Citation Download EndNote XML Download RIS Download BibTeX
	APP-BE-E.AS1.tab Tabular Data - 144.5 KB Published Jan 20, 2009 36 Downloads 13 Variables, 1986 Observations UNF:3:zRfu5fvCMSe7miAvXo3roA== Data file for this study 2e. U.S. Appropriations Data, 1946-1985 - AGENCY/ ITEM LEVEL	Preview "APP-BE-E.AS1.tab" Preview "APP-BE-E.AS1.tab" Access File File Access Public Download Options SPSS Binary (Original File Format) Tab-Delimited RData Download Metadata DDI Codebook v2 Data File Citation Download EndNote XML Download RIS Download BibTeX Explore Options Data Explorer v2
	APP-BE-E.AS2 Plain Text - 130.3 KB Published Jan 20, 2009 26 Downloads MD5: 5c3c4b98283c069fcbcb622496d0e3fd Data file for this study in ASCII format 2e. U.S. U.S. Appropriations Data, 1946-1985 - Department Level Data	Access File File Access Public Download Options Plain Text Download Metadata Data File Citation Download EndNote XML Download RIS Download BibTeX
	APP-BE-E.AS2.tab Tabular Data - 56.7 KB Published Jan 20, 2009 34 Downloads 12 Variables, 688 Observations UNF:3:hWRmNFlsGHEmp9NE2r7VhQ== Data file for this study 2e. U.S. U.S. Appropriations Data, 1946-1985 - Department Level Data	Preview "APP-BE-E.AS2.tab" Preview "APP-BE-E.AS2.tab" Access File File Access Public Download Options SPSS Binary (Original File Format) Tab-Delimited RData Download Metadata DDI Codebook v2 Data File Citation Download EndNote XML Download RIS Download BibTeX Explore Options Data Explorer v2
	approp.txt Plain Text - 11.6 KB Published Jan 20, 2009 26 Downloads MD5: f6445351e0eda97950c34c7cde154dba This is a codebook for three files: 1. app-be.e.as1, 2. app-be-e.as2, 3. usbudget.asc 2e. U.S. U.S. Appropriations Data, 1946-1985	Access File File Access Public Download Options Plain Text Download Metadata Data File Citation Download EndNote XML Download RIS Download BibTeX
	bce.htm HTML - 5.2 KB Published Jan 20, 2009 27 Downloads MD5: a0ffdbaf9dae6eb499c60e97fbe3862e A link to Cognitive Performance and Economic Incentives By Morganne Beck, Carola Clift, and Michael Ensley UCSD Faculty-Mentor Program 1996 2c. Experiments on Persuasion and Delegation: Experiments on Information, Persuasion, and Choice	Preview "bce.htm" Access File File Access Public Download Options HTML Download Metadata Data File Citation Download EndNote XML Download RIS Download BibTeX
	BILL-ASC.zip ZIP Archive - 34.1 KB Published Jan 20, 2009 24 Downloads MD5: f85bc48ee058b2984d32d8fed01d1a75 Data by department level, ASCII format, zipped file 2e. U.S. U.S. Appropriations Data, 1946-1985 - Department Level Data	Preview "BILL-ASC.zip" Access File File Access Public Download Options ZIP Archive Download Metadata Data File Citation Download EndNote XML Download RIS Download BibTeX
	BILL-CSV.zip ZIP Archive - 25.7 KB Published Jan 20, 2009 23 Downloads MD5: 0eedd2e968451fbd6b4210380002ac25 Data by department level, comma delimited ASCII file, zipped format 2e. U.S. U.S. Appropriations Data, 1946-1985 - Department Level Data	Preview "BILL-CSV.zip" Access File File Access Public Download Options ZIP Archive Download Metadata Data File Citation Download EndNote XML Download RIS Download BibTeX
	bud-dta.zip ZIP Archive - 2.9 KB Published Jan 20, 2009 25 Downloads MD5: 93a802418302c5271ca9c4cee5357810 Data file in stata format 2f. U.S. Budget Data - by FUNCTION	Preview "bud-dta.zip" Access File File Access Public Download Options ZIP Archive Download Metadata Data File Citation Download EndNote XML Download RIS Download BibTeX

Citation Metadata

Persistent Identifier	doi:10.7910/DVN/LCOZIW
Previous Dataset Persistent ID	hdl:1902.1/10582
Publication Date	2009-01-21
Title	Replication data for: Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House. Second Edition.
Author	Gary W. CoxUniversity of California, San Diego Mathew D. McCubbinsUniversity of California, San Diego
Description	Scholars who compare political parties invariably conclude that American parties are much weaker than their European counterparts: they are much less cohesive on legislative votes; their influence over the flow of legislation is less complete; they control but a small fraction of campaign money; they exercise almost no control over nominations; the list could go on. Within the American context, observers have commonly concluded that parties influence legislators less than pressure groups, political action committees, or constituents. Much of the literature of the 1970s and 1980s, moreover, was devoted to the thesis that American parties were declining--both in the electoral and the legislative arenas. If parties are so weak, then what are the organizing principles of American politics? The literature provides a ready stock of answers: In the electoral arena, it is the individual ca ndidates who have the most powerful organizations, who collect the most money, and who define the course of electoral campaigns. In the legislative arena, it is above all the standing committees of Congress--and, in the 1970s and 1980s, their subcommittees--that are the centers of power. The standard wisdom on the postwar Congress was that it had been an exercise first in "committee government," then in "subcommittee government." Party government usually received mention only as something conspicuously absent. This study reevaluates the role of parties and committees, and the interactions between them, in the post-World War II House of Representatives. Our view is that parties in the House--especially majority parties--are a species of "legislative cartel." These cartels seize the power, theoretically resident in the House, to make rules governing the structure and process of legislation. Possession of this rule-making power leads to two main consequences. First, the legislative process in general--and the committee system in particular--is stacked in favor of majority party interests. Second, because members of the majority party have all the structural advantages, the key players in most legislative deals are members of the majority party and the majority party's central agreements are facilitated by cartel rules and policed by the cartel's leadership.
Related Publication	Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2006. Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House. Second Edition. Cambridge University Press. article available here Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2006. Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House. Second Edition. Cambridge University Press. article available here U.S. Appropriations Data, 1946-1985 Referenced Publications Kiewiet, D. Roderick, and Mathew D. McCubbins. The Logic Of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Spring 1991. Kiewiet, D. Roderick, and Mathew D. McCubbins. "Congressional Appropriations and the Electoral Connection." Journal of Politics, February 1985. Kiewiet, D. Roderick, and Mathew D. McCubbins. "Appropriation Decisions as a Bilateral Bargaining Game Between the President and Congress." Legislative Studies Quarterly, May 1985. Kiewiet, D. Roderick, and Mathew D. McCubbins. "Presidential Influence on Congressional Appropriation Decisions." American Journal of Political Science, August 1988. Kiewiet, D. Roderick, and Mathew D. McCubbins. "Parties, Committees, and Policy Making in the U.S. Congress," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, November 1989. U.S. Budget Data Referenced Publications McCubbins, Mathew D. "Party Politics, Divided Government, and Budget Deficits, in The Politics of Economic Policy in The U.S. and Japan, edited by Samuel Kernell. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1991. McCubbins, Mathew D. "Party Governance and U.S. Budget Deficits: Divided Control and Fiscal Stalemate," in Politics and Economics in the Eighties, edited by Alberto Alesina and Geoffrey Carliner, National Bureau of Economic Research. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991. McCubbins, Mathew D. "Government on Lay-Away: Federal Spending and Deficits Under Divided Government," in The Politics of Divided Government, edited by Gary W. Cox and Samuel Kernell. Boulder: Westview Press, 1991. Cox, Gary W., and McCubbins, Mathew D. "Fiscal Policy and Divided Government," in The Politics of Divided Government, edited by Gary W. Cox and Samuel Kernell. Boulder: Westview Press, 1991. U.S. Congressional Membership and Committee Assignments, 1st Congress -100th Congress Referenced Publications Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House. Berkeley: University of California Press, Spring 1993. Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. "On the Decline of Party Voting in Congress." Legislative Studies Quarterly, November 1991. Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. "Party Coherence on Roll Call Votes in the U.S. House of Representatives," in Encyclopedia of the American Legislative System, edited by Joel H. Silbey. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1994. U.S. Congressional Roll Call Voting Data Referenced Publications Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House. Berkeley: University of California Press, Spring 1993. Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. "On the Decline of Party Voting in Congress." Legislative Studies Quarterly, November 1991. Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. "Party Coherence on Roll Call Votes in the U.S. House of Representatives," in Encyclopedia of the American Legislative System, edited by Joel H. Silbey. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1994. U.S. Congressional Legislative Histories Referenced Publications Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House. Berkeley: University of California Press, Spring 1993. Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. "On the Decline of Party Voting in Congress." Legislative Studies Quarterly, November 1991. Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. "Party Coherence on Roll Call Votes in the U.S. House of Representatives," in Encyclopedia of the American Legislative System, edited by Joel H. Silbey. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1994. U.S. Congressional Rules Data Referenced Publications Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House. Berkeley: University of California Press, Spring 1993. Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. "On the Decline of Party Voting in Congress." Legislative Studies Quarterly, November 1991. Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. "Party Coherence on Roll Call Votes in the U.S. House of Representatives," in Encyclopedia of the American Legislative System, edited by Joel H. Silbey. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1994. U.S. Federal Courts Data Referenced Publications McCubbins, Mathew D., Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast. "Political Control of the Judiciary: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law." The Southern California Law Review, September 1995. U.S. Presidential Vetoes, 1st Congress -100th Congress Referenced Publications Kiewiet, D. Roderick, and Mathew D. McCubbins. The Logic Of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Spring 1991. Japanese Budget Data Referenced Publications McCubbins, Mathew D. and Michael Thies. "As a Matter of Factions: The Budgetary Implications of Shifting Factional Control in Japan's LDP." Legislative Studies Quarterly, forthcoming August 1997. McCubbins, Mathew D. and Gregory Noble."Equilibrium Behavior and the Appearance of Power: Legislators, Bureaucrats and the Budget Process in the U.S. and Japan," in Structure and Policy in Japan and the United States, eds. P. Cowhey and M. McCubbins. New York: Cambridge University Press, August 1995. McCubbins, Mathew D. and Gregory Noble. "Perceptions and Realities of Japanese Budgeting," in Structure and Policy in Japan and the United States, eds. P. Cowhey and M. McCubbins. New York: Cambridge University Press, August 1995. McCubbins, Mathew D. and Frances M. Rosenbluth. "Partisan Allocation of the Personal Vote in Japan and the United States," in Structure and Policy in Japan and the United States, eds. P. Cowhey and M. McCubbins. New York: Cambridge University Press, August 1995. Experiments on Persuasion and Delegation Referenced Publications Lupia, Arthur W. and Mathew D. McCubbins. The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Lupia, Arthur W. and Mathew D. McCubbins. Beyond Rationality: Reason and the Study of Politics, Elements of Reason, eds. Arthur Lupia, Mathew McCubbins, and Samuel Popkin. Cambridge University Press, 2000. Event Studies Referenced Publications Lax, Jeff and Mathew D. McCubbins. Courts, Congress and Public Policy, Part I: The FDA, the Courts and the Regulation of Tobacco. Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues, 2006. Lax, Jeff and Mathew D. McCubbins. Courts, Congress and Public Policy, Part II: The Impact of the Reapportionment Revolution on Urban and Rural Interests. Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues, 2006.
Notes	Subject: STANDARD DEPOSIT TERMS 1.0 Type: DATAPASS:TERMS:STANDARD:1.0 Notes: This study was deposited under the of the Data-PASS standard deposit terms. A copy of the usage agreement is included in the file section of this study.;
Production Date	2006
Distributor	Mathew D. McCubbins http://mccubbins.ucsd.edu/index.html
Distribution Date	2007
Deposit Date	2007-09-14

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