1 to 7 of 7 Results
David E. Lewis, 2007, "Replication data for: Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design: Administrative Agency Insulation Data Set, 2003", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/JQJXQW, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:3:K4qJa8DRLD1w0209VZ7BAQ== [fileUNF]
This is a data set of United States government administrative agencies created between 1946 and 1997. The data were used for all quantitative analysis in the book. Each agency created during this period is 1 observation. The data set excludes advisory, quasi-official, multi-lateral, educational and research agencies, and support offices common to a... |
Nov 27, 2007
David E. Lewis; James Michael Strime, 2007, "Replication data for: What Time is it? The Use of Power in Four Different Types of Presidential Time, 1996", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/R1EIIS, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:3:TIpyu0Q+lo2Lq8bKDn1j+Q== [fileUNF]
This article describes and tests four different theories about how time constrains and defines the use of presidential power. It describes power use in theories arguing for a gradual secular increase in presidential power over time, in theories arguing for cycles of presidential power in time, in theories contending that power use is determined mos... |
Nov 27, 2007
David E. Lewis; Daniel C. Carpenter, 2007, "Replication data for: Political Learning from Rare Events: Poisson Inference, Fiscal Constraints and the Lifetime of Bureaus, 2004", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/ZLVEGY, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:3:wCC2FwMTyvY2ciKHaO0cGQ== [fileUNF]
How do political actors learn about their environment when the "data" provided by political processes are characterized by rare events and highly discontinuous variation? In such learning environments, what can theory predict about how learning actors will take costly actions that are difficult to reverse (e.g., eliminating programs, approving a ri... |
David E. Lewis, 2007, "Replication data for: The Adverse Consequences of the Politics of Agency Design for Presidential Management in the United States: The Relative Durability of Insulated Agencies, 2004", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/GNUNOZ, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:3:ae8lNDrAoZlDanY+k3j92w== [fileUNF]
The US Congress has often sought to limit presidential influence over certain public policies by designing agencies that are insulated from presidential control. Whether or not insulated agencies persist over time has important consequences for presidential management. If those agencies that persist over time are also those that are the most immune... |
Nov 27, 2007
David E. Lewis; William G. Howell, 2007, "Replication data for: Agencies by Presidential Design, 2002", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/MSZB3G, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:3:c/HaUCBpnd5//YpgGdXhKQ== [fileUNF]
Scholars have largely ignored one of the most important ways in which presidents influence the administrative state in the modern era, that is, by creating administrative agencies through executive action. Because they can act unilaterally, presidents alter the kinds of administrative agencies that are created and the control they wield over the fe... |
Nov 27, 2007
David E. Lewis, 2007, "Replication data for: The Politics of Agency Termination: Confronting the Myth of Agency Immortality, 2002", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/UFH9OC, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:3:hP7MFxd+8k1zAagTuOVkcg== [fileUNF]
This article examines agency mortality between 1946 and 1997 and argues that, contrary to popular belief, agencies are not immortal. Rather, agencies face significant risks of termination, particularly due to political turnover. When an agency's opponents gain power, the hazards of agency mortality increase. Principal among the findings of this pap... |
Nov 27, 2007
David E. Lewis; John B. Gilmour, 2007, "Replication data for: Political Appointees and the Competence of Federal Program Management, 2006", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/QDEEBK, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:3:1PGgPWTH61DST2AB4qg6Yg== [fileUNF]
In this article, we use the Bush administration’s management grades to analyze whether programs administered by senior executives are better managed than those administered by political appointees requiring Senate confirmation. We explain the administration’s management grading scheme and how it can be informative for evaluating comparative managem... |
