1 to 9 of 9 Results
Johnson, Jesse, 2017, "Replication Data for: Alliance Treaty Obligations and War Intervention", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/JUUU8W, Harvard Dataverse, V1
Theories of alliance formation and war suggest that alliances influence the probability that a potential challenger will initiate a militarized interstate dispute. This is because alliances are expected to influence their members’ likelihood of intervening in a potential war. More specifically, defense pacts are expected to increase the likelihood... |
Apr 19, 2016 - The Journal of Politics Dataverse
Leeds, Brett Ashley; Johnson, Jesse C., 2016, "Replication Data for: Theory, Data, and Deterrence: A Response to Kenwick, Vasquez, and Powers", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/SJJ158, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:6:lIH8QRhqE8sNyTYdt/cfMA== [fileUNF]
These files replicate the findings in "Theory, Data, and Deterrence: A Response to Kenwick, Vasquez, and Powers." |
May 22, 2015
Johnson, Jesse; Leeds, Brett Ashley; Wu, Ahra, 2015, "Capability, Credibility, and Extended General Deterrence", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/LT9TPB, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:6:G4Pg0ZTXDQPYVRPb/VCQiw== [fileUNF]
Deterrence theory suggests that extended general deterrent threats are likely to be more effective when a potential challenger views them as capable and credible. When states sign formal defense pacts, they are making explicit extended general deterrent threats. Thus, the population of defense pacts allows us an opportunity to judge the efficacy of... |
Sam R. Bell; Jesse C. Johnson, 2015, "Replication Data for: Shifting Power, Commitment Problems, and Preventive War", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/MYBQTZ, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:6:WEJ0kvxUiHy7jpwS1tQ9fw== [fileUNF]
Many scholars argue that leaders' expectations about future shifts in the distribution of power can result in preventive war. If a leader expects her adversary to be significantly stronger in the future, the leader may choose to go to war with that adversary rather than bargain with a stronger adversary in the future. However, quantitative evaluati... |
Chiba, Daina; Johnson, Jesse C.; Leeds, Brett Ashley, 2015, "Replication Data for: Careful Commitments: Democratic States and Alliance Design", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/DGHX1E, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:6:Scwy7ANl/KsVX9yelFi/aQ== [fileUNF]
Evidence suggests that leaders of democratic states experience high costs from violating past commitments. We argue that because democratic leaders foresee the costs of violation, they are careful to design agreements they expect to have a high probability of fulfilling. This may cause democratic leaders to prefer flexible or limited commitments. W... |
Nov 6, 2014
Fang, Songying; Johnson, Jesse C.; Leeds, Brett Ashley, 2014, "Replication data for: To Concede or to Resist? The Restraining Effect of Military Alliances", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/S0020818314000137, Harvard Dataverse, V2
Creating institutions that effectively manage interstate conflict is a priority for policy-makers. In this article we demonstrate that military allies are well positioned to influence the crisis-bargaining behavior of both challengers and targets in ways that often lead to peace. Through a three-player game-theoretic model, we demonstrate that a ta... |
Feb 18, 2014
Johnson, Jesse C.; Souva, Mark; Smith, Dale L., 2014, "Replication data for: Market-Protecting Institutions and the World Trade Organization's Ability to Promote Trade", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/24759, Harvard Dataverse, V1
Recent research has shown that the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/World Trade Organization (WTO), contrary to common perceptions, does not increase trade. We argue that the effect of the GATT/WTO on dyadic trade flows is conditioned by the strength of market-protecting institutions (MPIs), which are the fundamental determinant of tra... |
Feb 18, 2014
Johnson, Jesse C.; Barnes, Tiffany D., 2014, "Replication data for: Responsibility and the Diversionary Use of Force", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/24758, Harvard Dataverse, V1
Do state leaders use force abroad to divert supporters’ attention from domestic economic problems? Many studies in international relations attempt to provide an answer to this question but the empirical findings are inconsistent. In this article we argue that it is necessary to consider variations in supporters’ perceptions of leaders’ control of t... |
Jun 8, 2012 - Brett Ashley Leeds Dataverse
Jesse C. Johnson; Brett Ashley Leeds, 2012, "Replication data for: Defense Pacts: A Prescription for Peace?", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/LGR5Q7, Harvard Dataverse, V2
Do military alliances lead to peace or to war? Research has suggested that defensive alliances to potential targets deter dispute initiation (Leeds 2003b:427). This would seem to suggest that forming defensive alliances is a good policy prescription for those seeking to encourage peace. Yet, some argue that even if defense pacts have a deterrence e... |
